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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I analyze the 20th century text, A
Room of One’s Own, by Virginia Woolf (2005), and I engage with
Woolf’s concept of a woman’s need for a room of her own in which
she can be free to think for herself, study, write, or pursue
other interests away from the oppression of patriarchal societal
expectations and demands. Through library-based research, I
identify four screens in Woolf’s work through which she viewed
and critiqued culture, and I use these screens to
reconceptualize “a room of one’s own” in 21st Century terms. I
determine that the new “room” is intimately and intricately
technological and textual and it is reformulated in the digital
spaces of blogs, social media, and Web sites. Further, I
introduce the new concept of the technologized politically
embodied cyborg, or TPEC, and examine the ways 21st Century TPECs
are shaping U.S. culture in progressive ways.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE TECHNOLOGIZED POLITICALLY EMBODIED
CYBORG (TPEC): THE TPEC AND THE SCREEN AND THE SCREENING OF
WOOLF
Born and dead too soon
Troubled gender writing faith
Genius vision drowned
Amy Barnickel (2010)
Haiku Biography of Virginia Woolf
I always have been drawn to studying women and the various
contexts in which they interact with and are influenced by the
myriad of texts and technologies that they encounter in their
day-to-day lives. Primarily, I study these phenomena by
screening them through the lenses of literature and feminism. I
analyze the 20th century text, A Room of One’s Own, by Virginia
Woolf (2005), and I connect what troubled her about women’s
lives to what continues to weigh on my mind about them. Most
specifically, I engage with Woolf’s concept of a woman’s need
for a room of her own in which she can be free to think for
herself, study, write, or pursue other interests away from the
oppression of patriarchal societal expectations and demands. To
build on Woolf’s conceptualization of a space and a place for
this type of womanly activity, I theorize a 21st Century
reconceptualization of a room of one’s own and determine that
the new “room” is intimately and intricately technological,
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textual, and feminist, and this century’s digital cultural
feminists are using it to promote woman-friendly ideas and
empower themselves and others in interesting, effective, and
creative ways through everyday activism in blogs, social media,
and Web sites.
Virginia Woolf and I agree that some women’s issues cannot
be resolved within existing western patriarchal culture. And, in
some ways, blogs, social media, and Web sites by women can and
do promote anti-feminist and quite stereotypical portrayals of
women. But the history of feminism includes struggles with aims
that may seemingly be at odds with each other but are necessary
parts of the overall historical movement. For example, in 2009,
Thomas H. Ford remarked that “on the one hand, the rhetoric of
motherhood has been a central target in the feminist project of
exposing and repudiating the cultural logics that perpetuate the
oppression of women. And on the other, feminists have turned to
this same rhetoric when reflecting on the development of
feminism itself” (189). I acknowledge similar aspects of women’s
activity on the World Wide Web, but my primary focus in this
dissertation is the women who advance knowledge of women’s
issues and actively live their lives in ways that I believe
Woolf would have admired. The women you will read about in this
dissertation are enacting Woolf’s vision for empowering women to
2

write and participate in a cultural dialogue that values them
and their work. I also argue that 21st century technologies
offer avenues for the promotion of feminist ideals through a
variety of feminist textualities, and they can lead to higher
than present levels of cultural participation and influence by
women through various forms of writing that employ technological
tools.
I necessarily offer explanations of my understanding and
use of a number of important terms that I use throughout this
dissertation. Woolf thought of words as ever-changing, shifting,
and resistant to definition. I honor her relationship with words
and her sentiments about them, so it is important to me that I
share the meaning that I intend when I use and re-use certain
terms in this dissertation. Further, the terms that are defined
in this introduction have been particularly troublesome for
women. Their meanings have been constructed through the
influences of culture, literature, politics, and more, so it is
important to me to acknowledge their and my situations
(situatedness) within U.S. culture and the academy through which
I study them.

3

The Screening of Woolf

Virginia Woolf was an early feminist textual activist.
Woolf’s examples of technological textuality are models for
current-era breakthroughs for women who seek a non-patriarchal
literary and aesthetic authority and use feminist textual
technological textuality to influence the world in personal,
cultural, political, and global ways.
In this dissertation, I use the framework of four screens
that literary author Virginia Woolf used in her cultural
critiques to analyze critical, theoretical, and historical works
that relate to feminism, some aspects of social science, and
epistemology. I show how Woolf presciently wrote about timeless
women’s issues that resonate in today’s digital culture and in
some ways I resolve or at least address the concerns she
expressed in her essays and literary works. Finally, I show how
these texts and theories inform women in contemporary U.S.
culture who use textual technologies for activist purposes and
to promote feminist ideals.
As an extension and further analysis of Gubar’s (2005)
observations and especially of Woolf’s own writing, I analyze
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (2005) using four screens. In some
regards, the screens blur and become layered, as any
4

technological screen would if complicated by intense analysis
and interference. Although the Woolfian screens resist
categorization and linear models, they are useful as an
explanatory tool, and I think that their straightforwardness
will aid the reader in understanding the shifts that take place
when conformative, linear, rational, standardized, traditional
textual composition becomes intentionally and unintentionally
layered, personal, fluid, and ultimately activist through the
use of 21st Century technologies.
The four activist screens in Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own
(2005) are: sex, sexuality, and gender; aesthetics; misogyny and
the economics of enough; and epistemology. In the chapters that
invoke these screens, I demonstrate Woolf’s introduction of
these concepts by using her own textual examples. Additionally,
I show interesting examples of activist writing that experiment
with a variety of approaches that engender similar thoughts and
ideas but that are expressed on Web sites, via Facebook, and in
blogs that use virtual spaces to evoke a cyber-culture imagined,
image-rich, feminist screen of one’s own. I believe that Woolf
would have encouraged my approach to analyzing her work. She
often stated that reflection on difficult subjects was important
to understanding one’s own identity and one’s cultural context.
When she wrote, “Whatever may be their use in civilized
5

societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic
action” (35), she understood the value of reflective practice
and analysis.
By employing these screens, I expose pervasive and
discursive systems that encourage and discourage women’s active
involvement with and influence on culture through their use of
Internet technologies. For example, some methods of ‘scientific’
data collection are flawed from a feminist perspective. They may
inadvertently or intentionally influence the results of an
ostensibly objective, empirical study because of pervasive but
often unrecognized biases, assumptions, and power dynamics (such
as homogeneity). In the area of cognitive science, I examine
epistemology, or how we know what we know, and I illuminate the
work of feminist scientists who are revolutionizing and
deconstructing previously concretized scientific facts about the
brain, the mind, and the body. I respond to and disrupt cultural
dynamics that influence how women are able to function within
digital culture, such as the availability of resources,
financial autonomy, the patriarchal environment of U.S. culture,
and the favor of masculine aesthetics, which Woolf wrote about
and very keenly understood well before the age of the Internet,
but which persist today.
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The Technologized Politically Embodied Cyborg (TPEC)

I introduce the concept and definition of the TPEC early in
this dissertation because I think it is important to situate the
TPEC and its relationship with the other terms in this
introduction. With an early understanding of what the TPEC is,
the reader of this dissertation should be able to share the
nuances of meaning that I provide in the remaining important
terms.
There are many reasons to embrace the expansive ideas that
were put forward in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) The
Embodied Mind. The doors to understanding the world and the way
humans know it no longer need to be locked by the polarizing
notions of scientific secrecy or metaphysical mysticism. The
keys are available, and humans need only use them. Another way
of phrasing this might be, humans need only become them. In the
TPEC’s room of her own, technological tools are no longer just
prostheses; they are essential, embodied elements of the TPEC’s
position and place in the world. So, when technological tools
become so ingrained in the make-up of a TPEC—body, mind,
environment, space, and place—they can no longer be
characterized as being “used.” TPECs are in various stages of
becoming the tools they employ. Charles Wolfe (2005) stated this
7

idea well when he wrote, “If mind and body belong together, as
do body and brain, so do brain and world” (3). These are
relational concepts that integrate with one another, crossinform, and adapt, and they require an acknowledgment and
acceptance of the particularity of any observable phenomenon or
bit of knowledge. Moreover, by approaching scientific inquiry in
this way, especially as science relates to the brain and mind,
political maneuvers that enforce the cultural marginalizing that
is brokered by the perpetuation of all sorts of binaries such as
male/female, reason/emotion, universal/particular, and more, can
be returned to their more legitimate places on the spectra of
which they are a part.
But the restructuring of the way western culture conducts
scientific studies is just one way to progress toward embodied
science. In another way, western culture needs to set itself
free from antiquated notions that hold metaphysics, language,
and culture separate and distinct from the realm of science and
solely in the hands of the white male academic authority.
Indeed, because of the inclusiveness inherent in situatedness
and embodiment, it is imperative that, as Dougherty (2001)
states, “If such studies of man and society are finally to be
free of the taint of their old association with philosophy and
religion, then for the computationalists and memeticists there
8

is only one true way for them to achieve legitimacy: they must
become physical sciences”(92).
Dougherty’s claim is critical to the TPEC’s evolution as a
being that embodies the technological, fleshy, and spatial in
relationships with each other. Similarly, Dougherty believes
science must become a relational construct with
philosophy/metaphysics/religion/culture, and
philosophy/metaphysics/religion/culture must become relational
constructs with physical sciences. Hayles (2002) further
supports this claim when she states:
Beginning with relation rather than preexisting
entities changes everything. It enables us to see that
embodied experience comes not only from the complex
interlay between brain and viscera that Antonio R.
Damasio compellingly describes in Descartes’ Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, but also from
the constant engagement of our embodied interactions
with the environment. Abstract ideas of the body
likewise arise from the interplay between prevailing
cultural formations and the beliefs, observations, and
experiences that count as empirical evidence in a
given society. In this view, embodiment and the body
are emergent phenomena arising from the dynamic flux
that we try to understand analytically by parsing it
into such concepts as biology and culture, evolution
and technology(298).
Hayles (2002) goes on to say that this interplay between
environment, enculturations, and empirical evidence resulting in
categorical enculturations do not happen overnight—they take
time. And although disjunctures sometimes occur in the speed
9

with which humans adapt and change (slow) and the rate at which
technology changes and progresses (rapid), ultimately the TPEC
(the posthuman, to Hayles) will emerge. In this regard, Hayles
(2002) remarks,
The posthuman, whether understood as a biological
organism or a cyborg seamlessly joined with
intelligent machines, is seen as a construction that
participates in distributed cognition dispersed
throughout the body and the environment. Agency still
exists, but for the posthuman it becomes a distributed
function. Consciousness for the posthuman ceases to be
seen as the seat of identity and becomes instead an
epiphenomenon, a late evolutionary add-on whose
principal function is to narrate just-so stories that
often have little to do with what is actually
happening (319).
In my view, Hayles’ (2002) assertion that agency for
technological beings is a distributed function supports my
vision for a TPEC culture. Further, she states, “Here the
posthuman is embraced as the occasion to rethink the mind/body
split and the premise that mind and body, like the rest of the
world, preexist our experiences of them. As we have seen, the
relational stance . . . puts the emphasis instead on dynamic
interactive processes from which both mindbody and world emerge
together” (320). In other words, culture can no longer develop
alongside technology or vice versa—humans and machines are
becoming one and the same, and therefore, the TPEC is integrated
body-mind-machine that restricts the rigid categorization and
10

binarial relationships that in patriarchy have marginalized
women.
Ultimately, the TPEC world will embrace feminist theories
and related cognitive theories such as those proposed in The
Embodied Mind. That world will further incorporate the
interdisciplinary conjunctures that inform feminism and embodied
cognition, such as philosophy, psychology, metaphysics,
aesthetics, literature and language, and technology, and it will
understand them through accessible theories such as Dougherty’s
(2001) re-use of Balkin’s cultural software and Blackmore’s
selfplex, Hayles’(2002) mindbody, Wolfe’s (2005) social brain,
Ramachandran’s (1998) body/mind/brain, Haraway’s (1991) situated
scientist, Clark’s (1997) extended mind, and Woolf’s (2005) manwoman/woman-man. In the age of the TPEC, formerly exclusive
science- and technology-related fields can be broached through a
situated, embodied feminist technological screen, and expanded
acceptable ways of knowing the world will result from the
practice.
Throughout this dissertation, I divulge that the room of
one’s own that Woolf envisioned for women is, in the 21st
Century, a textual and technological screen located in a
physical and ethereal, embodied and prosthetic space/place.
Additionally, I introduce another dichotomous notion that may
11

not have been investigated before: some 21st Century
technologies, such as Web sites, Facebook pages, and blogs, are
social AND solitary. They have melded the binarial notion of
either/or by transgressing the binarial notion of social and
solitary as opposites. TPECs who write in these environments are
effectively writing “poetically and prosaically at one and the
same moment” (Woolf 44). They are on their way toward figuring
out how women can achieve in a new way the ideal of having a
room of one’s own for personal growth, promotion of feminist
ideas, and greater participation and influence on culture. The
paradigm shift is interesting and important because TPECs
incorporate these ostensibly social technologies in very
personal and intimate ways. In other words, in using newer
social technologies, women are effectively employing the
isolationist aspects of the practices associated with
technologies and therefore living out Woolf’s admonition for
isolation, but they also embrace the connectivity and community
that writing in a “public” space affords. In some ways, TPECs
using technological tools in this way is an extension of the
early feminist adage, “the personal is political.” This phrase
is indicative of what the TPECs are writing about: personal
issues that they grapple with and feel oppressed by but that
also have meaning in much broader, cultural political contexts.
12

This phenomenon will be elaborated on through the examples
analyzed in subsequent chapters.
Though the TPEC’s functions, boundaries, and cultural
phenomena are complex and problematic because they emerge from
patriarchy, they transgress formalized, patriarchal structures
that have been ingrained into western culture, and they move
feminism forward. In other words, the room of one’s own is
within the TPEC as well as it is a creation of the TPEC. Space
and place, as seen through the screens of the TPEC, follow
different and ever-changing rules. The room of one’s own is a
technological screen that is located in physical, ethereal, and
possibly other realms.

The TPEC and Interdisciplinarity

The TPEC has a place among many theoretical heuristics. In
this dissertation, I identify the discourses of “social
relations, identity, knowledge, and power [that] are constructed
through written and spoken texts” (Luke section 1, ¶1), that are
produced in digital environments, and that affect and are
affected by women’s participation in them. By drawing from
cultural and feminist theory, I make clear the distinctions I
see between the social behavior and expectations of women
13

(individually and collectively) and the cultural traditions that
support or restrict them. These concepts are related, but they
elicit distinct analyses that add nuance to the suggestions I
make and the possibilities I perceive for women who write and
act in digital environments.
Further, one of the many identities of Virginia Woolf was
rhetor. In other words, she wrote persuasive arguments on a
number subjects, including the education of women, literature,
economics, mental health, and others. In doing so, she sometimes
used experimental styles that may have camouflaged in some ways
her very progressive ideas about women and their intellectual
abilities. Virginia Woolf, I argue, used and appreciated a
variety of approaches to rhetoric that did not necessarily
conform to traditional, male-standardized styles, such as the
essay, or even persuasive articles. Woolf was able to subvert
patriarchal cultural expectations of writing through her
appreciation and use of non-linear, experimental writing styles.
In doing so, she enacted covert political statements about
western culture and what could and should be expected of women.
Her own experimentation and her appreciation for it in
others’ writing reminds me of what Barthes (1977) refers to in
his essay “Third Meaning” and elsewhere in Image, Music, Text as
the “obtuse” meaning that “appears to extend outside culture,
14

knowledge, information: analytically, it has something derisory
about it . . . indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories . .
. it is on the side of the carnival” (55). In A Room of One’s
Own, Woolf records emphatically the exquisite moment during
which she realized what it meant to her and for literature in
general that Mary Carmichael “tamper[ed] with the expected
sequence” (80) when she wrote the simple three words, “Chloe
liked Olivia” (80). For Woolf, the brazen while at the same time
subtle “third meaning” of these words broke women away from the
cultural, sociological, and rhetorical necessity to exist only
in relation to men or maleness. With these words, Woolf
remarked, “Mary Carmichael set to work to catch those unrecorded
gestures, those unsaid or half-said words, which form
themselves, no more palpably than the shadows of moths on the
ceiling, when women are alone, unlit by the capricious and
coloured light of the other sex” (83). In other words, Woolf
recognized exactly what Barthes (1977) desired: the importance
of third meaning. Further, for Woolf, the effect that this third
meaning brought forward was more complex than these few words on
a page might suggest: its statement transformed words into an
image, an image of women lifted into a space of freedom of
expression outside of the patriarchal authority of the male
gaze.
15

Additionally, Foucault and Derrida, who are discourse
theorists, assert that “language and discourse are not
transparent or neutral means for describing or analyzing the
social and biological world. Rather they effectively construct,
regulate and control knowledge, social relations and
institutions” (Luke section 2, ¶2). Derrida’s idea of “signing
my proper name” in his work critically informs feminist
technological textuality and the TPEC. Additionally, the French
feminist writer, social critic, and activist, Luce Irigaray
(1985) uses similar terminology when she claims in her essay,
“This Sex Which Is Not One,” that, historically, woman has been
denied a definition of her own and that indeed, she has “no
proper name” (251). In Chapter Four, I elaborate further on
these concepts and analyze some TPEC writing that, in my view,
expands on these concepts to create meaning for women using
technology for feminist activism.
Ultimately, Woolf (2005), Haraway (1991), Barthes (1977),
Derrida (1978, 1982), and Irigaray (1985) acknowledge that
writing needs to be freed from chronology, an established
literary format, a predetermined meaning, or other
organizational device that prohibits the reader and text from
encountering the other on their own terms. For example, it may
be more revealing of some insight for an author or a reader to
16

follow a seemingly insignificant thread for his thoughts than it
would for him to construct a logical, planned, incremental
argument because the point of interruption of routine or
trajectory is often the moment when an innovative idea will
occur. When a writer proceeds along a pre-set path, she pays
less attention to ideas that lie along the periphery of the
writing subject. Intervening in the momentum of that
straightforwardness can yield new insights and ideas. This can
be done in any way that is appealing to the author. For example,
she may write a poem or Haiku such as the one I wrote at the
beginning of this chapter. Then, using the words and the few
syllables that make up the poem, the feminist textual
technological activist may choose to “google” the terms to
discover associations among them that she may not have been
aware of before. Choosing and researching further some of those
associative findings may reveal insights into patriarchal
cultural assumptions and practices that affect women negatively,
and which may inspire the TPEC to perform an act of
technological textuality.
Upon first encounter, this type of experimentation in
writing seems strange, random, or even silly, but its value is
great—if for no other reason than its instantaneous disruption
of hierarchized, binarily organized, conformist (patriarchal)
17

writing structure. Barthes conducted similar textual experiments
with his works S/Z and Image, Music, Text, along with his essay
on third meaning in which he introduces the concepts of the
readerly and writerly texts. Woolf used similar techniques to
engender her own writing, and in doing so she performed landmark
textual acts that still resonate in contemporary western digital
culture.
Additionally, biographers and scholars have noted often
that Virginia Woolf was aware of and familiar with the work of
Sigmund Freud, one of the world’s most renowned psychologists
and the originator of psychoanalysis. And though many Freudian
theories have since been proven suspect or obsolete, interesting
and useful Freudian-inspired writing methods inform the TPEC and
are similar to the approaches to writing that Woolf used and
promoted to other women who would write. For example, Freud’s
approach to “dream work” (1952) evokes comparison to Woolf’s
admonition that “it is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the
submerged truth sometimes comes to the top” (Woolf 2005 31).
Similarly, Freud used in his psychoanalytic practice of dream
work “the rule of giving equal notice to everything” (357) in
which the therapist and the patient (and for my purposes, the
writer) “should simply listen, and not bother about whether he
is keeping anything in mind” (357). Further, when a writer uses
18

Freudian dream-work writing methods, she considers “foreground
and background, conditions, digressions, and illustrations,
chains of evidence and counterarguments” (Freud 40).
Interestingly, Woolf also wrote, “we need to skip and saunter,
to suspend judgment, to lounge and loaf down the alleys and byestreets of letters” (Lee 407). Lee states that Woolf also
described “her roaming and observations in London streets (on
her way to buy a pencil) as a form of reading. She becomes ‘an
enormous eye’ which can leave ‘I’ behind, leave the ‘tether’ of
a ‘single mind’ and ‘the straight lines of personality,’ and
deviate into the bodies and minds of others’” (407), which
further echoes and expands on Freud’s dream work approach.
Additionally, writing using the methodology of the dream
work helps the writer and the reader by making it more obvious
that “each train of thought is almost invariably accompanied by
its contradictory counterpart” (Freud 40), and “the logical
links which have hitherto held the psychical material together
are lost” (Freud 41). In dream work, this loss is not a bad
thing but a liberating condition that allows associative
thoughts, ideas, and ways of understanding to emerge. What
becomes important for scholarly dream work are the break in
associative thought patterns, the interruption of assumed
meanings, and the divergence of non-linear thoughts.
19

Freudian dream work writing and Woolf’s idling, daydreaming
method are the opposites of patriarchal academic, linear,
formulaic approaches in which the writer pre-formulates a
hypothesis and sets about to prove it. Engendering dream work
and Woolfian writing entails conducting crucial analysis on the
non-obvious or the formerly neglected detail. I use contemporary
examples of similarly-third-meaning-laden words, Freudian dream
work inspired method, and Woolf-like idleness to demonstrate how
women who write in digital formats evoke the obtuse meanings of
our time that may seem simple but may transform their roles in
U.S. culture.
The TPEC’s Scope

The observations and arguments put forward in this
dissertation are centralized to U.S. culture specifically, and
western culture generally, and I recognize that this limits the
scope of the project. Because of concerns for time and space, I
do not treat every aspect of western nor non-western cultures
and their sometimes drastically different conditions relating to
women, writing, and the various technologies that influence
them. In fact, eighty percent of the rest of the world “still
lacks basic communication infrastructure, and two-thirds of the
world’s population have never made a phone call” (Emerging
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Technologies 1997). So I want to acknowledge at least on some
level that the disparate treatment of women, women’s writing,
and women’s participation in writing and other creative pursuits
in U.S. culture, though very important and critical in my view
to the progress of women globally, must be weighed against
realities such as those identified above that many of the
world’s citizens continue to endure.

Masculinity and Femininity

I refer to masculinity and femininity as cultural terms
that include sex (genitalia), gender (western traditional male
and female roles), and cultural connotations that include power,
intelligence, dominance, and place within hierarchical social
structures. In masculinity, sexuality is external, dominant, and
sometimes violent. In femininity, sexuality is internal,
vulnerable, and passive. Masculine and masculinity are more
highly valued in western culture, and feminine and femininity
are undervalued, often to the point of ridicule. For example, it
is valuable (for men, but not for women) in many western
contexts to be physically strong, loud- and low-voiced, dominant
over others, and in charge—attributes that are generally
associated with men. Similarly, in U.S. culture it is less
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desirable (for men and for women) to be soft-spoken and higherpitched, weak-muscled, petite, and cooperative—attributes that
are generally associated with women.
These traits become problematic for women and men who
exhibit counter-gender-stereotypical qualities in dominant
cultural contexts. For example, a woman may be criticized for
having a low voice or large muscles, or a man may be
marginalized for having a high-pitched voice or diminutive size.
Even greater cultural pressure is wielded against individuals
who gender-identify as a gender different from the one that
their sexual organs indicate.
Therefore, understanding these terms is important to
comprehending my position that technologies, especially since
the industrial revolution, have been and continue to be
gendered, and they are gendered because they developed in
patriarchal social and economic systems. In particular, computer
technology is inherently masculine because it was and continues
to be developed within a culture that values masculinity over
femininity or other identifications. And therefore, it follows
that computer-generated or influenced texts embed masculine
features that require examination at deep levels and exposure by
cultural critics like me.
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Throughout this dissertation, I critique the masculine and
feminine influences on textual technologies and I divulge their
confluences. I draw from a variety of feminist models to inform
my understanding of these terms and their constructions. African
American and womanist feminisms, for example, insist that
gender, class, race, differing abilities, and other factors
should be considered when texts and technologies are developed
for users. They ask that scientists, authors, or other creators
consider “how and under what conditions the technology will be
used” (Rosser 6) and that the consumer of the technology or text
be included in the design and shape of the product. Radical
feminists might agree that users should help design technologies
according to their needs and wishes, but radical feminists might
also say that doing so is not possible for women because
maleness, masculinity, and patriarchy are so “intertwined with
technology and computer systems in our society” (Rosser 11) that
no woman-centered technology or text could possibly exist within
that framework. These theories collide with traditional
canonical literature of all kinds, and much has been written and
debated about which works should be included in literary canons
because of these inherent inequalities and marginalizations.
In this dissertation, I agree with Woolf that women should
write not as the men of the canon have written but as
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themselves. For Woolf, writing as one’s self does not mean
writing as a woman or writing in a feminine way. In Woolf’s
view, “it is fatal for anyone who writes to think of their sex.
It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple. One must be
woman-manly or man-womanly” (Woolf 2005 103). I draw on this
avenue of discussion in Woolf’s writing when I divulge and
dissect the complexities, possibilities, and dangers of writing
in digital and Web-based environments in which, presumably,
women find it (easier, more fulfilling, acceptable, accessible?)
to establish themselves as “woman-manly or man-womanly” authors
who, by virtue of the technological environment, are ostensibly
free from societal norms and expectations. In this regard, the
literature is mixed, with some scholars heralding the
androgynous nature of the World Wide Web and other digital
environments. Other scholars, including some feminist theorists,
condemn the Internet for polarizing the sexes and reaffirming
sexist stereotypes and social constructs. Even more
interestingly, this body-mind complexity is supported by
cognitive scientists such as Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991),
who substantiate their multivariant heuristic for epistemology,
which I elaborate on further in Chapter Seven. I use the theory
of situated, embodied cognition that they put forth to delve
deeper into my analyses by explaining, using at least this one
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cognitive theory, how the brain and mind formulate what women
know and how they come to know it. I suggest that researching
the brain and mind in this way is critical to establishing that
feminist approaches are valid, worthy, and revealing means
through which reality and the truth of the nature of the western
world can be divulged.
There is support for my assertions among other cognitive
scientists as well, and indeed, the very definition of cognitive
science that is offered by Hubert Dreyfus in his essay
“Cognitivism Abandoned,” (1995) indicates that cognitive science
is a multidisciplinary field and would welcome this diversified
approach to analyzing women’s technological lives. Dreyfus
defined the term cognitive science in a very understandable and
approachable way, and his definition is the one that I maintain
in my discussion. Dreyfus stated, “Cognitive science is any
attempt to explain how the mind and brain produce intelligent
behavior . . . it’s just the name for a natural confluence of
all the disciplines that study the mind-brain: philosophy,
linguistics, computer science, anthropology, neuroscience,
psychology” (72). And I believe that Dreyfus would agree that
feminist theory; theories of texts and technology deserve a
place in that definition as well (73).
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Further, many older constructs of how humans know things or
how knowledge is produced are based on the positivist model of
science that supports the notion that genius, eureka-like
discoveries are rare and that knowledge is built in incremental
stages that work toward some ultimate truth about the world. But
at least since the 1990s, cognitive scientists such as Clark
(1997, 2003) and Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) have begun to
acknowledge what feminists have argued for a very long time:
what we know (or what we think we know) is based on our
situation, our particular experiences, and the social constructs
(Wittig 1992) that influence the way we think and behave.
Because of the multiplicity of influences on our ways of
knowing, I argue that epistemology must abandon old notions such
as disciplines or fields that segregate sciences from art, for
example, or literature from technology, and embrace an
interdisciplinarity that promotes an understanding that for most
truths there are exceptions and that most exceptions expose some
type of marginalization, erasure, or compromise, and often,
those effects are based on gender. With this notion I connect
and show how feminist theories and theories of knowing converge
and how these can enlighten what 21st century feminists are
beginning to know about women’s participation in textual
technologies.
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For example, in very interesting ways, Katherine Hayles
(1990, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2008), whom I consider an
epistemologist, a feminist, and a scholar of technology and
literature, especially and expertly intersects the realms of
textual technologies and cognitive theory in ingenious ways that
provide insight into embodiment issues that were important to
Woolf and remain critical to current culture. Woolf was
incredibly astute in screening the world through the history and
reality of the people who read and write. As a woman denied a
formal education, she was already keenly aware in 1929 of a fact
that Vanevar Bush observed in “As We May Think,” which was
originally published nearly twenty years later in 1948, that the
library (the great bastion and icon of formal higher education),
even the great libraries, are not “adequate maps of knowledge”
(Murray 3), especially with regard to the history,
contributions, and capabilities of women.

Patriarchy

Patriarchy is the systemic, systematic, governmental,
communal, and familial domination of virtually everything by
men. Patriarchy is a cultural construct that values masculinity
and traditionally male-associated qualities, aesthetics, and
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hierarchies over all others. And it is also a system that
devalues women and the feminine. In fact, its opposite,
matriarchy, rarely, if ever, exists in the larger contexts of
communities and societies.
Historically, cultures that valued the “organic, female
world view” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246) have existed, but since the
industrial revolution, patriarchal values have taken hold in
almost all cultures—western, Asian, middle eastern, African, and
others—and have escaped much criticism. I agree with Kilbourne &
Weeks (1997) that patriarchy values the mechanical and sanctions
the scientific, material control and domination of nature and
women and that U.S. culture is entrenched in patriarchy.
In this dissertation, I critique some of the patriarchal
societal conditions that affect women and their ability to
participate fully in the emerging textual technological society
of the west. Identifying my understanding of patriarchy is
necessary to help readers see some of the difficulties involved
with women’s participation with texts and technologies,
especially Internet technologies. For example, a common
assertion about the World Wide Web is that its technological
environments are great gender equalizers—that men and women are
free of gender roles, sexual identifications, and other societal
constrictions that limit how they can behave (Bryson 1996). In
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other words, this technology is not simply an instrument or a
means of production, but its essence is a construct itself of
societal values, dominant cultural norms, patriarchal
hierarchies, and other influences. In cyber environments,
ostensibly women can be men and vice versa, or each can be nonhuman, partially-human, cyborg, or even another species
altogether. That assertion may sound believable and even benign,
but unless it is examined by uncovering and exposing the
patriarchal values that allow people to operate in cyberspace in
cross-gendered ways, we may not know that research has also
shown that gender stereotypes, aggressive behavior, and other
patriarchal cultural signifiers are meted out in cyberspace just
as they are in ‘real’ life. In fact, the stereotypical
differences among genders, for example, are sometimes magnified
and exploited at even higher levels (Balsamo 1999).

Essentialism

My general understanding and definition of the term
essentialism is that it describes a certain group of beliefs
that claim that many things, animals, and humans have
undeniable, basic qualities that are always present in their
makeup, even when personal choices or environmental factors
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suppress or mask those qualities or encourage expression of
others. When I use the term with regard to my feminist critiques
of various issues, I understand it to mean that U.S. culture in
particular and western culture in general, which dominate many
of the world’s environments in their cultural pervasiveness and
ubiquity (English language is the world’s default language,
money in all financial realms is valued in comparison with the
dollar, white skinned, thin female bodies are idealized, etc.).
These cultural dominations include technology in many respects,
because many technologies assume women’s qualities at their
supposed very basic human level when women’s capabilities,
attitudes, intellect, and competence are considered.
Further, because of the entrenched cultural values begun in
The Enlightenment, western culture has established certain
universal characteristics of maleness and femaleness. Some among
many possible examples are the essentialistic notions of
dichotomies that assume certain male and female relationships
such as male:culture, female:nature. And, in a patriarchal
western society as I have described above, maleness and culture
also mean power, privilege, and freedom; femaleness and nature
also mean restricted usefulness and boundary-enforced existence.
Deeply embedded understandings such as these are very difficult
to negotiate, and I argue that they are especially difficult to
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negotiate when technologies have the potential to allow their
borders to be permeated. For example, women’s bodies have been
some of the first to incorporate technological prostheses, and
our culture manipulates women’s bodies through medical
technologies every day--breast implants are an obvious example,
but other examples from the medical field are infertility
treatments and cesarean births. Societal conflicts arise from
technologizing the natural, or essential, woman, and they begin
to emerge and cause tension when members of western culture
realize that to be technological is to be at the forefront of
creativity, production, information, and power—the things that
more typically make up majority culture or the masculine
essential--but are now also deployed in large measure by women
(even when these deployments are by choice or by force).

Embodiment

Throughout this dissertation, my arguments are informed by
Donna J. Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention
of Nature (1991), which heavily influences my views on feminist
technological textuality. Haraway’s and Woolf’s works recognize
and repudiate dualisms such as male/female and body/mind, and
these binary notions and others are taken up by contemporary
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textual technological feminist activists and me, and all of us
acknowledge in our writing the importance and examination of
embodiment.
Embodiment, especially as it relates to a woman’s place in
the world and also as it relates to writing, voice, agency, and
being acknowledged as human, is a critical element of textual
technologies. Embodiment is a relational term—and as mentioned
earlier, even the notion of the term woman is relational; women
and women’s bodies have almost always been understood as, by
many definitions, what they are not (Irigaray 1985), or what
they lack as compared to men and men’s bodies. There is
negativity associated with the womanly or feminine qualities:
weak, not strong; feeling, not thinking; hysterical, not
rational. The woman’s body itself in Freudian terms is the
castrated male—somehow undeveloped, incomplete, and lacking
because it has no phallus. Woolf agreed when she wrote, “almost
without exception they are shown in their relation to men . . .
[they] were . . . seen only in relation to the other sex” (81).
Donna Haraway (1991) clearly elaborated the fact that
embodiment has historically been used to marginalize women as
incapable of the scientific ideal of distance, objectivity, and
externality. For example, in her “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science,
Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth
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Century,” Haraway (1991) describes the cyborg in a way
reminiscent of Woolf’s description of the ideal woman writer who
is man-womanly or woman-manly. And Haraway (1991) goes further
by introducing the concept of the technologized body into the
description when she states, “The cyborg is a matter of fiction
and lived experience that changes what counts as women’s
experience . . . this is a struggle over life and death, but the
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an
optical illusion” (149). Their ideals are similar and both Woolf
(2005) and Haraway (1991) acknowledge the necessary
transgression of boundaries as well as the harmful nature of
dualisms that impede women’s progress, activity, and
participation in their cultures. The similarity and urgency of
Woolf’s and Haraway’s arguments in this regard make a bridge
between the literature of Woolf and the science and technology
of Haraway that I find useful for understanding technological
textuality and its digitization of the concept of a room of
one’s own in the 21st century in the form of Web sites, Facebook
accounts, and blogs.
It is important to note that one of the newest, most
challenging forms of feminism has sprung directly out of
computer and Internet technology: Cyberfeminism. Cyberfeminism
is a woman-centered perspective that “advocates women’s use of
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new information and communications technologies for empowerment”
(Millar 200). Cyberfeminism also positions these technologies as
“inherently liberatory” (Millar 200) because women are “uniquely
suited to life in the digital age” (Millar 200) because of their
socialization toward relationships, networking, and communitybuilding, which are also concepts that underlie computer coding
and Internet navigation and usage.

Embodiment and Power

Finally, if people in western culture are to begin to think
about writing, scholarship, and ways of knowing as alwaysalready 1 embodied, then proper attention has to be given to how
embodiment is related to power and how power relates to women’s
agency. Women’s bodies have historically been objectified and
commodified by patriarchal systems. Irigaray makes this point in
her essay “This Sex Which is Not One” (1985), which I mentioned
earlier. It is very difficult for women to gain agency for
themselves when the very bodies that they have to move around in

1

I don’t want to spend an undue amount of time unpacking the use of the term
“always-already,” especially because there is some controversy over the
originator of the term. Generally, when I use this term, I refer to it in a
Derridian sense, which means that though there may be a perceived or
generally accepted beginning to some phenomenon or event, typically, when the
phenomenon or event involves expectations of women, there are other forces
already at work that influence its course and skew meaning or outcome.
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are immobilized, negated, neglected, and ignored. From her
specific example of compulsory heterosexuality’s literal
splitting of the female body (through the heterosexual sex act)
and rendering it a mere vessel for a man to her more
philosophical idea that before women can be liberated they must
physically, culturally, and in other tactical and practical ways
separate themselves from men and their patriarchal systems of
domination, Irigaray proposes radical moves that disrupt
traditional power dynamics.
In another way, Aimee Carrillo Rowe (2005) adds to the
discussion of embodiment and agency by suggesting that women
have also become adept at negotiating their identities based on
the politics of their location and their relation to the
environment in which they act—what she calls “belonging” (28).
For example, Carillo Rowe takes apart the idea of ‘home’—a
concept that carries with it assumptions of safety, insularity,
comfort, and ease, but that, for women, often delivers an
environment contrary to those ideals and that changes her level
of agency and her understanding of her identity. Carrillo Rowe
also acknowledges that women constantly negotiate their sense of
belonging, and that the negotiations “are all functions of
power” (16). She argues that although standpoint theory such as
the one Haraway (1991) suggests has value and is a progressive
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idea, a more nuanced way to interrogate discourse is to examine
the belonging in which one’s standpoint is “placed in motion”
(28) and offers the “possibility for the formation of critical
and collective modes of agency as well as new demands for
accountability” (28). In the example of home, above, the word
carries with it white, heterosexual, and nuclear familial
assumptions that are so embedded in the term that they may go
completely unrecognized by the powerful white majority in the
U.S., but they carry with them great amounts of power and
dismissal for women who don’t ‘belong’ in that definition. In
other words, standpoint recognition is not enough to explain our
situatedness; accountability for complicity in unspoken
privileges is also important to feminist work and it is a
critical factor in the amount of agency a woman can access. In
contrast to Irigaray, Carrillo Rowe’s ‘belonging’ is much less
utopian and in my view, it furthers the discussion of
situatedness and brings practicality into this philosophical
discussion surrounding the TPEC and feminist technological
textuality. Additionally, belonging adds nuance to the alwaysalreadiness of embodiment.
Carrillo Rowe’s work moves toward what Claire Colebrook
(1997) seems to have been looking for when she wrote “Feminist
Philosophy and the Philosophy of Feminism”. Colebrook wonders
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whether a feminist philosophy can even exist apart from being
defined, much as Irigaray argued about women, by what it is not.
Carrillo Rowe’s insistence on acknowledging one’s ‘belonging’ is
one way of moving toward what Colebrook calls the “truly
philosophical . . . less gender-biased . . . privileged notions—
of reason, subjectivity, rights, and so on” (80). Colebrook
argues (and she claims that Heidegger also does) that western
philosophies have traditionally disregarded difference, and in
so doing, have contributed to the perpetuation of patriarchal
power dynamics. What Colebrook and Carrillo Rowe have in common
is their ultimate insistence that “philosophy may not just be a
question of ideality, pure truth, universalizable ethics, and
transcendental conditions” (Colebrook 95) and that a feminist
philosophy would not be “philosophy’s essential other”
(Colebrook 95) but would be one among many.
These are some examples of how feminist theorists approach
the probing questions that Virginia Woolf asked about her
culture and the status of women. These juxtapositions indicate
that real problems still exist regardless of how careful and
inclusive a philosophy or theory attempts to be: who remains
excluded? Who is forgotten? which constructions of the term
‘women’ are being left out of the discourses that dominate? For
women, the philosophical and the practical have always been
37

intertwined, interconnected, and inseparable. That is why the
issue of women’s agency is so difficult to sort out and
negotiate. But I think that, at least for many women in the U.S.
who have access to computers, education, employment, and other
relative freedoms such as sexuality and religion, part of the
key to increased agency is their participation in emerging
technologies, especially Internet technologies that promote a
sense of a woman’s having her own place for writing, formulation
of ideas, and expressions of creativity—the very things that
Virginia Woolf was calling for through her own essays and
fiction.

2

Additionally, self- or un-labeled feminists in- and outside
the academy are enacting the theoretical model of the TPEC by
participating in technological textuality that shapes western
culture in profound ways that can potentially free women of some
2

I must acknowledge my own positionality with regard to the material I
present. Although I believe that I have presented well the complications of
women’s agency, I must acknowledge that I argue as a person who is situated
in conditions of relative power. I am a white woman who works in
administration in a large university in the U.S. I make a decent wage, I own
a home, and I have much power and agency because of those situations. I may
have marginalized other women who are different from me; I may not understand
that I haven’t escaped many binarial notions at all. I need to learn a whole
lot more about the situations of women that are not like my own. I would like
to better live the ideals that I espouse, because the very fact that I can
write down my words for others to read is a form of power than many millions
of women in the world do not presently have. I do not intentionally assume to
know what all the challenges are for women of cultural backgrounds that are
different from my own. I am careful to at least remain aware of the
privileges I describe and carry within my writing, but I understand that at
times my situated analysis may fall short.
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of the oppressions of patriarchy that hold them down.
Ultimately, though Irigaray and Wittig may disagree that turning
the world “right side up again” (Truth 232) should be the goal,
I do know that “these women together ought to be able to” (Truth
232).

A Screen of One’s Own: The TPEC and Feminist Technological
Textuality in the 21st Century

Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms defined in
Chapter One to help flesh out my primary argument that TPECs are
enacting the call to write that Virginia Woolf put forward in
the early 20th Century. Nearly 100 years later, her ideas
resonate deeply with feminists. For women in general there is
still much progress to be made in many areas, but most assuredly
in the academy, as serious scholars of ourselves, we must
investigate women’s issues thoroughly. In Chapters Two through
Six, I use the screens I have identified in Virginia Woolf’s A
Room of One’s Own to analyze the practices of current-day
textual technologists who write using new media in new ways that
promote a feminist agenda. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I make
some suggestions about what this all means for women, TPECs, and
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U.S. culture. The following synopses of Chapters Two through Six
identify the primary focus of each chapter.
In Chapter Two, I assert that technological textuality is
the use of textual technologies to promote cultural change,
shift ways of thinking, or transgress boundaries through writing
or using images in progressive ways. An extension of this term
is feminist technological textuality. In feminist technological
textuality, the cultural changes, shifts in ways of thinking,
and transgressions of boundaries are promoted by individuals and
groups who use technology to educate, critically analyze norms,
traditions, and the status quo, and spread awareness of cultural
traditions and assumptions that oppress, marginalize, or are
counter-productive to women. It follows, then, that TPECs are
feminist textual technological activists, whether they aspire to
be or not. And because of the media through which they write,
which is a visual, fluid, fluctuating environment, their work
becomes a force for positive cultural change.
In Chapter Three, I assert that eighty-some years after
Woolf wrote A Room of One’s Own (2005), it is still true that
many women are not allowed and also do not often claim for
themselves the time, space, and freedom of thought to be
creative, even though womens’ ability and desire for creativity
are arguably more recognized and accepted today. What
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complicates this fact in the 21st Century is that, despite some
progress in terms of autonomy and independence that women have
realized, they continue to be marginalized through a patriarchal
culture that denies them freedoms that are taken for granted by
men. In other words, gender matters in writing. But gender is a
nebulous term that is ill-defined in 21st Century digital
culture, where gender-bending, gender-switching, genderidentifying, trans-gendering, and other forms of gender
negotiations are moving from the margins toward the center. This
fact complicates but also enlivens the scholarly conversation
about who gets to write, who has access, and who uses digital
technologies for progressive purposes. The TPEC is at the
forefront of this phenomenon.
In Chapter Four, I look at the screen of aesthetics.
Aesthetic ideals and preferences are inexorably linked to
culture. In U.S. culture, aesthetics are indoctrinated through a
patriarchal viewpoint that values male over female. Further,
many technologies, especially since the industrial revolution,
have been and continue to be gendered, and they are gendered
because they developed in patriarchal social and economic
systems. In particular, computer technology is inherently
masculine. This fact can be demonstrated by surveying the
historical underpinnings of technological developments,
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examining the various approaches that feminist theories have
taken toward computer technology, and finally, by situating
Virginia Woolf’s work relative to this position and describing
how women are using Internet technologies to create their own
aesthetically pleasing environments and increase their personal
and collective agency.
Further, I take up the notion of identity(ies) as texts and
connect foundational feminist theories, theories of texts and
technologies, Woolf, and TPECs. In my view, studying texts and
their influence by, on, and within technologies, is one way that
women can participate in refashioning how western culture
perceives and appreciates identity, individuality,
interconnectedness, relationships, and power. Ultimately, those
also are the aspects of society that continue to perplex the
TPEC and that continue to be addressed by feminist textual
technological activists who host Web sites, use Facebook
accounts, and write blogs.
In Chapter Five, I approach the idea that in 21st Century
digital culture, the TPEC is constantly mediated through a
series of screens, or screenings. Woolf recognized this in her
time, and some of her astute observations about misogyny and its
relationship with economics apply still today. In one of her
deepest and most heart-felt observations, Woolf prophetically
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stated about the women’s conundrum, “I thought how unpleasant it
is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be
locked in” (Woolf 2005 24). She movingly iterates how so many
women, even to this day, feel about living within patriarchy,
even those who don’t know intellectually against what they are
struggling: fighting to gain foothold within the constructs of a
society that doesn’t allow women to fully engage and
participate, even when success is realized, is often bittersweet and dissatisfying to women because, once “in,” they face
alienation, envy, and jealousy from those who remain without as
well as emptiness of meaning within themselves because the
‘inside” remains aesthetically barren, intellectually
unrewarding, and materially insufficient. The balance that
ideally could exist between the man-womanly and the woman-manly
remains skewed in favor of the manly.
In Chapter Six, I explain epistemology as a feminist
concept and elaborate the areas of conjuncture among the various
disciplines and theories that grapple with how we know what we
know. This last screen, epistemology, is very important, and I
use this chapter to explain how cognitive theory, feminist
theory, and theories of texts and technologies work together and
can effect change in the way knowledge is constructed,
perceived, and evaluated. While doing so, I also draw on Woolf’s
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astute observations about epistemology to demonstrate the
connections I make between her work, the theoretical
underpinnings, and the examples of contemporary TPECs who use
digital technologies to advance the work and worth of women.
Moreover, by understanding that the brain and the body have been
shown scientifically to be intimately co-important, a feminist
epistemology that values context and situation, that posits
facts as social constructions, and that favors the particular
over the universal, when it is paired with the concept of the
embodied mind, has the potential to be adopted by western
culture in general and enacted in technological environments
that can empower women.
Finally, Chapter Seven is a chapter of possibilities. In
the decades since Woolf’s time, women have emerged through the
aftermath of several wars, sexual revolutions, the “me” decade
of the 80s, the return to “balance” in the 90s, and the current
new millennial era, which is unfolding as I write. These screens
translate into current cultural topics that can be used in
technological environments such as Web pages, Facebook accounts,
and blogs that garner attention from the media, academicians,
and the general public. It is clear that Woolf embodied the
TPEC’s fluid identity. Unfortunately for Woolf, there were few
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if any outlets besides her writing in which she could express
her multiple selves.
Woolf clearly envisioned a TPEC future for politically
engaged feminist textual technological activist women writers.
The TPEC in the 21st Century combines Woolf’s politically
embodied writer with Haraway’s cyborg and the capabilities of
women who use Internet technologies. The TPEC honors Woolf’s
assertion that “a book is not made of sentences laid end to end,
but of sentences built, if an image helps, into arcades and
domes” (Woolf 2005: 76). I show how her work may have influenced
the creative post-postmodernized writing of the women who run
Web sites, update Facebook accounts, and blog. In the end TPEC
writing is “adapted to the body”(Woolf 2005: 77), tampers “with
the expected sequence” (Woolf 2005: 80), and “catch[es] those
unrecorded gestures, those unsaid or half-said words, moths on
the ceiling, when women are alone, unlit by the capricious and
coloured light of the other sex” (Woolf 2005: 83).
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CHAPTER 2: THE TPEC AS FEMINIST TEXTUAL TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVIST
AND THE SCREENING OF VIRGINIA WOOLF
They are highly democratic.
They believe that one word
is as good as another . . .
They hate being useful,
they hate making money,
they hate being lectured about in public.
In short, they hate anything
that stamps them with one meaning
or confines them to one attitude.
For that is their nature: to change.
Virginia Woolf
(BBC 1937)

Feminist Technological Textuality

As mentioned in Chapter One, the theoretical basis of this
dissertation is multidisciplinary and includes aspects of
cognitive theory, feminist theory, and theories of texts and
technologies. I use these theories to observe and analyze the
changes in societal norms and expectations that have taken place
in the recent past and that continue to pervade the present and
inform and influence the future. Specifically, Internet
technologies such as Web sites, Facebook accounts, and blogs are
vehicles for feminist technological textuality in current times.
Textual technologies are technological tools that transform
earlier versions of high-technology and formerly low-technology
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resources into hybrids of the two. I primarily use the term to
refer to the transformation of books, news, social commentary,
and other media through computer technology and its applications
such as Facebook, Web sites, and blogs.
Technological textuality is the use of textual technologies
to promote cultural change, shift ways of thinking, or
transgress boundaries through writing or using images in
progressive ways. An extension of this term is feminist
technological textuality. In feminist technological textuality,
the cultural changes, shifts in ways of thinking, and
transgressions of boundaries are promoted by individuals and
groups who use technology. Through their use of technology, they
educate others and critically analyze norms, traditions, and the
status quo, and they spread awareness of cultural traditions and
assumptions that oppress, marginalize, or are counter-productive
to women.
In current western culture, women can use, and are using,
technological textuality that promotes personal, cultural, and
scholarly feminist ideas. It often has been said in recent years
that millennial generation women are rejecting older forms of
feminism, and they are reluctant to claim the term feminism and
describe themselves as feminist. Some claim the current era is
post-feminist in part because of the everyday activist
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opportunities that textual technologies afford, and their
increasingly inherent or “seamless” presence in western culture,
I argue that feminist technological textuality resists and
transforms the controversial label of feminism. Through using
textual technologies, women in some ways have embraced the
ideals of feminism by simultaneously blurring some of the
perceived boundaries between feminist and mainstream culture.
Later, I will describe how Virginia Woolf’s writing can be
understood as early feminist textuality. Her work, A Room of
One’s Own (2005),and many of her other texts are easily compared
to contemporary textual technological activist texts that
criticize and demand similar things in 21st Century technological
environments such as social networking sites, Web sites, and
blogs.

The TPEC As Feminist Textual Technological Activist

In A Room of One’s Own (2005), Woolf fervently calls for a
woman to have a room of her own and money that is not tied to
her family or a man. But in addition to this, she also declares
the need for silence for women. In other words, she believes
that a woman who would write cannot achieve writing without
being able to be alone with her thoughts, away from distractions
48

of the home and other concerns. More recent research suggests,
however, that the 21st century woman--especially the younger,
coming-of-age woman (the age of the women that Woolf addressed
in the original lecture she gave on the subject)--views silence
in a very different way. Currently twenty-something aged women
in the U.S. do not value isolation, time alone, or even quiet,
according to a recent article in The Chronicle Review by William
Deresiewicz (2009), who outlined the “romantic ideal of
solitude” (B7) as “the arena of heroic self-discovery” (B8). He
declares that modernism created the suburb, and with it, the
“universal threat of loneliness” (B8) that seems to pervade U.S.
culture even now, in the postmodern age. Though he, like Woolf,
believes in the value of silence and quiet contemplation, he
goes on to state that the invention of computers and Internet
technology was a turn of events that is not without its positive
qualities--such as its ability to allow “isolated people to
communicate with one another and marginalized people to find one
another” (B8). But Dereseiwicz also observes that “as the
internet’s dimensionality has grown, it has quickly become too
much of a good thing” (B8) in that “a constant stream of
mediated contact, virtual, notional, or simulated, keeps us
wired to the electronic hive” (B8). And I argue that the TPEC is
situated right in the middle of this complex and complicated set
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of older vs. newer cultural expectations. And, the TPEC has
learned to adapt the intrusive technologies to her own need,
which is the need to establish a space and a place in which her
thoughts, ideas, and creative products are her own and over
which she has control.
For the younger generation of women currently in their
twenties, this constant interruption of technological devices
has become “completely natural” (Deresiewicz B8), and they have
“no desire for solitude, have never heard of it, can’t imagine
why it would be worth having” (B8). This might or might not have
been viewed as sad news to Virginia Woolf. Like me, she might
have proclaimed that there is a difference between silence and
being “unplugged.” And there are nuances that make solitude
different from loneliness that might not resonate with the
younger generation of women who have grown up with computers,
cell phones, and all sorts of high-tech devices. But unless
Woolf and I proclaim such things in 160-character Facebook
updates, they may go unnoticed. Woolf might have agreed with
Deresiewicz that the younger generation should understand that
“solitude enables us to secure the integrity of the self as well
as to explore it” (B9) and that longer periods of sustained
reading are necessary because “no real excellence, personal or
social, artistic or philosophical, scientific or moral, can
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arise without solitude” (B9). But Virginia Woolf did not know
about computers, and I speculate that, had she had access to
them, she might have embraced the possibility of simultaneously
keeping connected with culture, family, friends, news, and world
events and fulfilling her personal desire for solitude and deep
sustained thought and her natural tendency toward shyness. Her
need for these things might have thrown her into depression and
suicide in her day, but I argue that, had she access to Facebook
or the Internet, for example, she might have, like so many 20somethings today, found a balance between the social aspects of
the technologies and their isolative qualities that in some ways
fulfill some women’s needs. After all, social networking is
typically not done in groups. At its surface, it is a “plugged
in” technology that seems to encourage constant contact,
disclosure, and brevity of thought. But at its deeper levels,
the act of being logged in to a social network, a Web site, a
blog, or even texting on the cell phone, is a solitary act. One
performs it alone, at one’s own speed, at one’s own will, and
one comes and goes from it at her own choosing. Potentially, the
act of using Internet and social networking technologies may
engender the idleness of which Woolf spoke, the free association
of thoughts that Barthes embraced, and the paying of equal

51

attention to the seemingly insignificant details that Freud
espoused.
Katherine Hayles (2008) and many others in recent years
disagree with the notion that the twenty-something and younger
generations are incapable of deep thought and prolonged
consideration of complex subjects that Deresciewicz suggests. At
a video-conferenced lecture that I attended at the University of
Central Florida in 2008, Hayles stated that although the
millennial generation learns differently and may have a shorter
attention span, one of the ways to engage the younger generation
is to meet them on their own turf, to consider how video games,
for example, might be adapted to introduce classic literature or
complicated theories. At the time of Hayles’ lecture, Facebook
was not as pervasive as it is today, but I think she might have
agreed that the introduction of classic literature and
complicated theories is taking place in this forum, and there is
some evidence that people are paying attention and engaging with
it. For example, a quick search on Facebook for the term
“Virginia Woolf” yields 247 Facebook accounts, 54 of which are
obviously dedicated to the author. These 54 accounts garner a
total of 884 “friends.” Aside from the biographical information
on the author, many of these accounts delve into Woolf’s
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content, themes, feminism, and other higher-level areas of
thought.
Unlike Deresiewicz, Hayles hasn’t (nor have I) lost hope
that younger generations will continue in their own ways to
contribute, argue with, and create new paradigms that allow
formerly marginalized voices to be heard. But, if Web pages,
Facebook accounts, and blogs in themselves are aspects of the
21st century rooms of one’s own, of what historical importance
could the texts that they produce become? Are the texts
themselves important historically, or are the engagement,
action, and pervasive cultural influence of these phenomena the
most historically relevant and transformative? The TPEC sheds
some light on these questions.
Scholars have speculated about the possibility that the
Internet might provide spaces in which marginalized communities
can come together and individuals can seek refuge from bodilyworldly customs or constrictions. Moreover, these technologybased social, political, and interest-based communities are
responsible for revolutionary changes in societal constructs and
knowledge, such as those described in Canada by Francois Lyotard
in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984).
Baudrillard (1975), too, argued more than two decades ago that
images, or, in other words, anything that is viewed through or
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on a screen, trump reality and “supercede reality in importance”
(Hill 26), at least in postmodern western culture. Gregory Ulmer
(1985, 1994) might agree because he uses similar analogies in
his theoretical work about moving from literacy to electracy.
And, Virginia Woolf’s screens help formulate the TPEC’s
imag/e/ined room of one’s own, on/in/through which the TPEC
performs activist texts that contribute to and influence in
positive, feminist ways the culture in which they live.
As mentioned earlier, the metaphorical frames that I use to
extend arguments are characterized as screens. I use this method
for several reasons, but primarily, the term screen resonates on
a number of levels with the critical and progressive writing of
Virginia Woolf. She clearly viewed the world through screens
that were different from those that were used and expected of
women in her dominant culture. I use the screen metaphor to
connect her classic work to current feminist technological
textuality on Web pages, Facebook accounts, and blogs.
Using the screen approach works well for paying respect to
Virginia Woolf’s writing and progressive ideals. Susan Gubar
pointed out in her introduction to the annotated edition of A
Room of One’s Own (2005), for example, that Woolf employs a
number of feminist “diatribes” (lii). One of the first of these
diatribes is “’the instinct for possession, the rage for
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acquisition’ driving those in its thrall ‘to desire other
people’s fields and goods perpetually; to make frontiers and
flags; battleships and poison gas; to offer up their own lives
and their children’s lives’” (lii). In other words, Woolf often
chose to diatribe against the patriarchal cultural ideal of war,
which is a rather common trope in feminist criticism. I also
agree with Gubar that Woolf is particularly insistent in A Room
of One’s Own (2005) that what the west embraces as capitalism
is, at its core, detrimental to the situation of women. Woolf
recognized that capitalistic practices are born out of
patriarchy and perpetuate war, violence, border-building, and
death because capitalism pursues acquisition above all else.
Woolf was adamantly opposed to these behaviors and ideals. By
processing her socio-political critique through the screen that
I label “misogyny and the economics of enough,” Woolf discerned
what would be necessary for women if they were to be able to
participate fully in life, education, politics, writing,
literature, and more.
Woolf’s feminist admonitions still ring true, and I add to
them by linking Woolf’s experimental writing style with
contemporary technology-influenced experimental, activist
writing that takes place on Web sites, blogs, and Facebook
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accounts such as jezebel.com, current.com, mom-101, and Minal
Hajratwala.
Woolf published A Room of One’s Own in 1929, the year after
women in England won the right to vote. It is important to note
that I wrote the preceding sentence in the active voice—because
Virginia Woolf did literally publish her own works at Hogarth
Press, which she established with her husband in 1917. Although
she had been widely published in England and in the U.S. prior
to beginning her own publishing operation, after 1921 she
published all of her work in England at Hogarth Press. I mention
these facts because later, they become important to my project
of drawing parallels between Woolf’s life and work and women
currently working or establishing themselves as authors by selfpublishing in digital contexts, an activity, I wager, of which
Woolf certainly would have approved.
Further, in A Room of One’s Own (2005), Woolf establishes
one primary argument and several secondary arguments. Her main
idea is that women should write by whatever means they have,
through whatever avenues are available to them, for whomever
will read it, and even if nobody reads it. The imperative is
that women write: “Therefore I would ask you to write all kinds
of books, hesitating at no subject however trivial or however
vast. By hook or by crook, I hope that you will possess
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yourselves of money enough to travel and to idle, to contemplate
the future or the past of the world, to dream over books and
loiter at street corners and let the line of thought dip deep
into the stream”(107). In my view, Woolf would have enjoyed the
grass-roots style of writing and participating that the Internet
allows in its free blog spots, email accounts, social networks,
and Web site access. Indeed, the blogger who writes mom-101 (see
Figure 1), who is known only as “Liz,” commented on a similar
phenomenon that happens on her blog and the comments that are
shared on it.

Figure 1: Mom-101 blog logo

Mom-101 writes in her entry from July 21, 2008, “There's
this funny thing I've discovered about comments on blog posts.
You can spend hours crafting a long, heartfelt essay about
falling in love with your baby, close with some offhanded line
about oh...let's say, lime popsicles, and then 80% of your
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commenters will weigh in about lime popsicles.” Mom-101 is being
facetious, but her thought echoes Woolf’s in that she points out
that sometimes what we think is important turns out not to be,
and sometimes what we think is unimportant turns out to be the
idea that sparks interest in a continued conversation. And like
Woolf, mom-101 decides by the end of this post that this
meandering of her mind and the minds of her readers is
acceptable, and writing for writing’s sake is an incredible
achievement in its own right. She writes,
We don't have to be ashamed about what we do or why we do
it. Whether we blog for money or friendship or approval or
attention or magical beans. I said it in the first
Momosphere panel and I meant it: It's all good . . .
Sometimes writing for an audience leads you to a ballroom
stage in front of 1000 other writers so you can finally
start to banish the voices in your head that tell you
you're not good enough. But that's not the only place it
leads. Maybe your writing leads to you a party where you
meet someone who may end up becoming a dear friend for the
rest of your life. Maybe it leads you to shake hands with a
celebrity. Or maybe this kind of writing leads you to
contribute to a book . . . Thank you to you for being the
place that my writing leads. Because you were there. Or
because you are here . . . It's freaking hot in New York
today. I could go for a lime popsicle (July 21, 2008).
Further, even at face-to-face conferences of participants
in the “blogosphere,” participants are embracing the genderneutral ideals of some feminist digital practices. As evidenced
by the photo in Figure 2, which shows the registration table at
the 2008 BlogHer conference.
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Figure 2: BlogHer 08 Conference registration table

Indeed, Woolf wrote that one of the most remarkable moments
in history occurred outside any professorial textbook or
governmental accounting of wars: “towards the end of the
eighteenth century a change came about which, if I were
rewriting history, I should describe more fully and think of
greater importance than the Crusades or the War of the Roses.
The middle-class woman began to write” (Woolf 2005 64). Indeed,
using 21st Century technologies, the TPEC is the new middle-class
woman, and her Web sites, Facebook updates, and blogs are her
new way of writing. And even though Woolf acknowledges a number
of serious obstacles to women writing, which include lack of
isolation for sustained thought, dedicated space, money, and
material things, ultimately she insists that “if we have the
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habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think
. . . that (emphasis mine). . . even in poverty and obscurity,
is worthwhile” (112).

The Image-Writing of the TPEC

Woolf’s writing embodies the woman-manliness and the manwomanliness that she advocates in A Room of One’s Own (2005). In
it, Woolf describes the way that she approached her own writing
when she had been asked to give the lecture at a women’s college
in England, the text of which would eventually become the book A
Room of One’s Own (2005). Because the method seemed counterproductive at the time she experienced it, the route she took to
discovering what she really wanted to say would foreshadow the
methods of later scholars who put forward theories for
engendering writing, such as Barthes in A Lover’s Discourse
(1978), Derrida (1978, 1982), and Ulmer’s (1994) Heuretics and
Mystory. In her final remarks, she laid out how she researched
the topic that she was asked to speak on--women and fiction. She
described how paralyzing it was for her to sit in the library
for hours with “a blank sheet of paper on which was written in
large letters WOMEN AND FICTION, but no more” (Woolf 2005 25).
Because she had probably learned from the men who taught her
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(family members and Bloomsbury associates) to write in a very
linear way, beginning with a topic, forming an outline,
sketching basic ideas, and so on, she assumed that doing so was
the only appropriate tactic. But Woolf’s bitterness about her
father’s denial to her of a formal education may have spurred
her to embrace the method that she employed and ultimately
recommended to the audience of her lecture. In other words, the
actual process that she undertook for accomplishing her writing
of that lecture was much less linear and directive than she had
been taught to expect. She was shocked at the time, too, when
she arrived at the messages of A Room of One’s Own (2005) in
very circular and roundabout ways that were not at all familiar
and that certainly were not intellectual or academic as the
terms were understood in her time. Rather, her process for
writing the lecture was prompted by a series of seemingly
inconsequential events that happened to her while she prepared,
such as a direct encounter with patriarchal systems in place in
the university environment when she was forced by a beadle, or
supervisor, to vacate the men’s university grounds onto which
she had strayed. And in another instance, when she contrasted
her experiences of having participated in a dinner amongst the
university men at which they enjoyed lavish courses, much wine,
and exquisite desserts and at a dinner among college women at
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which they had stale meat and bread pudding with only water to
drink. Earlier, she wrote that “while I pondered I had
unconsciously, in my listlessness, in my desperation, been
drawing a picture where I should, like my neighbor, have been
writing a conclusion” (Woolf 2005 31). Even in her daydreaming,
she was a performative, embodied writer, and her actions offered
a premonition of Ulmer’s later recommendations for discovery
through image-writing and the aforementioned research by Lyotard
and Baudrillard on images.
Woolf allowed these experiences—the feelings, the images,
the dialogues, as well as the more traditional textual research,
to enter her writing and to influence her observations about the
world, and she exhorted the women students to whom she lectured
to continue their learning, earn their own money, and establish
for themselves their own private spaces within their homes so
that they might continue to produce valuable textual works for
themselves. Woolf’s writing, as well as her methods for
engendering it, are excellent examples of feminist textual
activist writing that infuse the personal and the political and
that, through apparent haphazardness and fluidity, led to
prophetic insight. She knew that drawing a picture was not
supposed to lead her into composing a thoughtful and provocative
lecture, but nonetheless she allowed herself to do it, and the
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result was a phenomenal feminist classic piece of literature
that later solidified her reputation as a serious author and
scholar.
Woolf’s techniques might be considered early methods of
mystory, a concept that was introduced by Gregory Ulmer, who has
done an immense amount of scholarly work developing his concepts
of ‘mystory’ and ‘electracy’. Ulmer (Invent-L Conference 2007)
stated “the grammatological interest in imaging place is the
possibility (by analogy with the invention of conceptual
categories, topics and the like) of inventing a practice of
electrate reasoning.” In my view, Woolf was an early imager of
place who understood, before the phenomena of the Internet and
the World Wide Web, that a sense of place, whether imaged, as
Ulmer refers to it, or imagined, as Appadurai (1996) might say,
is important to writing in new, creative, and, I argue, activist
ways. The TPEC as a feminist textual technological activist
engages these imaged/imagined spaces to perform her writing and
reach newer and wider audiences with progressive ideas.
Further, Ulmer’s (1994) description of mystory includes a
similar approach, and, specifically, he states that mystory is:
designed to simulate the experience of invention, the
crossing of discourses that has been shown to occur in the
invention process. Realizing that learning is much closer
to invention than to verification, I intended
mystoriography primarily as a pedagogy. The modes of
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academic writing now taught in school tend to be positioned
on the side of the already known rather than on the side of
wanting to find out (of theoretical curiosity) and hence
discourage learning how to learn (xxi).
Ulmer echoes Woolf’s admonition to move away from established
formulas and academic, institutional methods for creating texts
and write “as women write, not as men write” and to ignore “the
perpetual admonitions of the eternal pedagogue” (Woolf 2005 74).

The TPEC in Performance

So, what does TPEC writing look like? How does one know
when she is reading a TPEC text? There are many adjectives that
describe TPEC writing: reflective, political, personal,
confrontational/challenging, inviting, commentary and
discussion-inducing, non-formulaic, feminist, re-mapping,
embodied, contributory, social and solitary, negotiative. To put
these descriptors into any type of hierarchical scheme would be
disingenuous and anathema to a TPEC writer; at times the TPEC is
more one than the other, less negotiative and more
confrontational, more personal and less political, etc. But a
TPEC’s writing necessarily includes feminist insight and
content, and it consciously or unconsciously disrupts
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patriarchal assumptions about its topic whether the topic be
culture, literature, information, or any other.
In the performative writing that is featured below, I
construct a story whose characters are the TPECs, who are used
as examples in this dissertation, and me (whose examples are
taken from my Facebook page). This conversation did not take
place in real time, and these “characters,” I believe, do not
know or even know of one another in reality other than that some
of them are now my “friends” on Facebook. But as a TPEC writing
exercise, I construct this conversation as a demonstration not
only of TPEC writing, but also to show how TPECs from across the
globe from quite different cultural environments recognize
themselves in each other because they perform their feminism in
similar, familiar textual ways. Although their conversation
below did not actually happen, their statements, feedback, and
responses mesh together as if it did. This exercise shows in a
creative way how TPECs can know and recognize each other, even
when they come from disparate backgrounds, locations, time
periods, and circumstances.
This story is not traditionally crafted. The statements
that each TPEC makes are lifted directly from her Facebook page,
her blog, her Web site, or another form of her writing. Some of
the statements are her own and some are comments to her content
65

by other TPECs who contribute to her digital space. But make no
mistake: that they come together as a conversational story is no
accident. TPECs embody textual technological feminism, and these
qualities are especially present in their words. Whether they
come from the Mexico-U.S. borderlands, L.A., the Mid-west, or
anywhere else, their words are recognizable to each other and
their thoughts and ideas complement each other as a conversation
that reveals their ideals, politics, and important contributions
the culture-building conversation they are a part of.

The Characters:

Liz:

The writer of a mommy blog, mother of two, married in
a heterosexual relationship

Shannon:

The homosexually married lesbian moderator of a
Facebook

Minal:

page about feminism in the 21st Century

American of Indian descent, writer, lesbian, believer
in unicorns

Amy:

The moderator. Single feminist mother of two girls,
divorced, doctoral candidate desperate to produce a
compelling feminist dissertation that means something
for women writers
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Carmen:

Mexican Maquiladora worker, single mother of three,
living in a ramshackle home with a dirt floor just
south of the U.S.-Mexico boarder

Sarah:

30-something single woman with a budding career in TV
journalism and comedy writing

Jezebel:

Multiply-dimensioned and personalitied writer for a
pop culture Web site with a feminist twist

Virginia: A prolific, childless, androgynous, manic, brilliant
feminist matriarch writer

Their Conversation:

Amy:

What exactly is a TPEC?

Sarah:

Mostly, we just look like women.

Jezebel:

We need to target the mother. Call it sexist, but
that’s the way nature made it.

Amy:

She is the very epitome of understatement, but at the
same time she is the strongest, most generous,
compassionate person. Give thanks for great moms!

Sarah:

Because she’s a woman. Stick yourself in the middle of
enough women, and it’s like you practically are one.
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Amy:

If she’s nothing else, she’s brave. But what does a
TPEC woman do?

Carmen:

Every day, we clear new paths.

Sarah:

Tell me more about this foolproof system.

Amy:

Sometimes you just got to take the trash out,
girlfriend. Put it out at the curb and don’t wait til
Friday.

Carmen:

We make changes in our daily lives, in our
communities, in our workplaces, and within ourselves.

Virginia: do what will be for your good and for the good of the
world at large.

Amy:

How does she fare economically and physically for
doing all of this?

Carmen:

When I started working there, my nose used to bleed.

Amy:

Unbelievable.

Shannon:

The raw wage gap continues to be used in misleading
ways to advance public policy agendas without fully
explaining the reasons behind the gap.

Jezebel:

Misogyny is sucking the life force today.

Liz:

Sadly, I’m used to it.

Carmen:

When I started to work there, I liked the environment.

Sarah:

It all comes down to people like her.
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Shannon:

The seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the size of
the paycheck brought home by the woman and the larger
one earned by a man doing the same job.

Sarah:

Here, have $.75 of my dollar.

Liz:

I can be better, we can all be better. At giving
credit and acknowledging inspiration and simply
supporting one another.

Amy:

What is important to TPECs politically?

Sarah:

This year, nothing is hotter than politics.

Liz:

So today, [election day] I want to go out on a limb
(with encouragement by Julie and Jon Stewart) to take
on the crazy. Because the only crazy I like in this
country is on Bravo every night around 9pm and
involves Botox.

Sarah:

If they want to know what’s important to us, they
should just watch our favorite show!

Shannon:

Well, that’s good! And thankfully none of them are
Republicans.

Amy:

I have no idea whether this Krystal Ball is fit for
congressional service, but her response to her
republican detractors is spot on. I say keep on
running, Krystal!
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Jezebel:

Repubs are so dead set on all of us wimmenz having
babies whether we want to or not. Denying us the most
basic rights over our own bodies, and yet, if you
happen to be a woman of the wrong skin color, you’re
using your womb to invade our country.

Shannon:

We have been sleepwalking into an authoritarian police
state and our civil liberties continue to be taken
from us without restraint or justification. We must
protect our rights!

Liz:

Now these initiatives may not line up with your
values, and in that case, I will try to respect that,
but they certainly line up with mine.

Shannon:

Sign this petition in case it helps.

Amy:

Is the TPEC angry?

Sarah:

Particularly women are angry.

Virginia: Anger had snatched my pencil while I dreamt. But what
was anger doing there?
Sarah:

They ask some serious questions.

Amy:

In honor of . . . all the other women who explode at
inopportune times and cause a mess.

Sarah:

It’s not arguing, it’s just looking for consensus
loudly.
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Virginia: All I retrieved for that morning’s work had been the
one fact of anger.
Sarah:

I am a woman, so I must be angry.

Amy:

So how does a TPEC go about writing?

Carmen:

We see things differently.

Sarah:

You may need to adopt an approach based on a metaphor
or simile.

Virginia: The artist as ‘lightening conductor’ has the capacity
to feel the shock of electricity and convey it without
being consumed by it.
Shannon:

There surely is no higher form of humor, indeed no
more fulfilling calling, than being deliberately
offensive.

Sarah:

some women do need a more empirical approach.

Liz:

We generate ideas and put together words in ways that
engage our audience and connect us with our
communities. It’s profoundly personal, whether you’re
writing about apple tarts or your baby’s first steps.

Minal:

I was thinking about scuba diving, about water as my
element (I’m a Cancer) and about my name which means
fish . . . I woke up . . . by my dreams, which were
very beautiful and involved a lot of wild swimming. It
71

was a beautiful sunny day. . . I felt this was an
excellent beginning . . . so I went down the hill to
the bakery, ate a grilled fennel focaccia, had an
affogato across the street at the gelato place, and
drove to the beach. I boogie boarded and swam in the
ocean for a couple of hours, then laid on the beach
for awhile. Now I’m off to dinner with a friend . . .
I did them with joy.
Virginia: It poured itself out, higgledy-piggledy, in
torrents of rhyme and prose, poetry and philosophy
which stand congealed in quartos and folios that
nobody ever reads.
Amy:

Maya Angelou once said, “People all over the world use
words: the writer comes along and has to use these
most-in-use objects, put together a few nouns,
pronouns, verbs, adjectives . . . and pull them
together and make them bounce, throw them against the
wall and make people say, ‘I never thought of it that
way.’”

Minal:

How beautiful to hear the cadences and languages, to
watch the faces and take in the voices that—finally—
made sense.
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Virginia: When a woman speaks to women she should have something
very unpleasant up her sleeve . . . let us agree,
then, that a paper read by a woman to women should end
with something particularly disagreeable.
Liz:

My references to writer’s rape has struck quite the
negative chord with survivors of sexual violence, and
I can’t say I blame them. It was strong, provocative
language, and I employed it based on my understanding
of the traditional definition and other uses of the
word. My intent here is never to hurt anyone, and
certainly not to marginalize the survivors of real
physical and emotional harm in any way.

Sarah:

Yeah, I think, duh, too.

Minal:

I want to be present for whatever’s going on in life,
too. So if I end up not being able to write as much as
all that, I figure I’ll at least have several thousand
words through the effort, which is more than I’d
probably produce otherwise. Hooray for productive
failure!

Virginia: There must be no obstacle in it, no foreign matter
unconsumed.
Liz:

Because that says, this person has smart ideas. This
person writes good words.
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Minal:

I’ve been noticing this lack of language myself. What
language there is sounds rather mundane, and doesn’t
in any case communicate the actual experience to
someone who hasn’t had it.

Liz:

Our ideas and our words: They’re all we got. That’s
it. Ideas and words.

Amy:

Final thoughts?

Sarah:

I learned a lesson from that.

Amy:

Some happenings are very difficult to believe.

Virginia: Ought not education to bring out and fortify the
differences rather than the similarities?
Shannon:

Hooray! I’m finally useful despite my lack of a penis!

Sarah:

I cannot wait for this all to be over.

Carmen:

We have learned about our rights as women and as
workers.

Jezebel:

Now, I realize, I *have* to be here. I have to be the
one to speak up, to notice the injustice, and to yell
out for everyone that is treated as less than human.

Shannon:

Feminism isn’t merely important to the 21st Century, if
there is to be any progress, feminism IS the 21st
Century.

Sarah:

Oh yes. I went there.
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Through their various feminist textual acts, TPECs are
involved in an ongoing conversation that flows, interacts,
reacts, and pushes boundaries that may formerly have kept them
from realizing the power of their words, their deeds, and their
progressive ideals. In Chapters Three through Seven, the TPECs
in the conversation above are featured in examples of Woolf’s
cultural screens at work in digital feminist textual
environments. They illustrate the value of observing and
critiquing culture through a feminist technological lens, and in
doing so, they add to the repository of historical texts that
document the TPEC’s important role in negotiating digital
culture.
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CHAPTER 3: SCREENING SEX, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER
Have you any
about women in
notion
aware that

notion of how many books are written
the course of one year? Have you any
how many are written by men? Are you
you are, perhaps, the most discussed
animal in the universe?

-Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005)

When Woolf wrote about the need for a room of one’s own,
she wrote a truism that inspired generations of feminist textual
activists. In 2010, eighty-some years after she wrote A Room of
One’s Own, it is still true that many women are not allowed and
also do not often claim for themselves the time, space, and
freedom of thought to be creative, even though women’s ability
and desire for creativity are arguably more recognized and
accepted today. But what complicates this fact in the 21st
Century is that, despite some progress in terms of autonomy and
independence that women have realized, they continue to be
marginalized through a patriarchal culture that denies them
freedoms that are taken for granted by men. Women still perform
the majority of childrearing, household chores, and cooking
duties, and, whether they are married or not, often are expected
to work and provide income for the family. Women who choose to
not participate in traditional male-female marriages, living
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arrangements, and societal norms are denied opportunities in
other ways because of their identification as single, single
mother, homosexual, or childless (among others), all terms that
marginalize many women as Other (Other meaning a group of others
with similar qualities) and lacking. Monique Wittig (1992) sums
up the phenomenon of the “Other” when she states, “What has
happened in history throughout the revolutions which we have
known is that the Other (a category of others) has substituted
itself for the One, keeping under it huge groups of oppressed
peoples that would in turn become the Other of the ex-others,
become by then the One” (53). Scholars such as Grosz 1994;
Haraway 1991; Hayles 2001; and Miller 2001 have observed this
phenomenon of “othering.” They recognize the influence of
technologies on everyday households in western culture, and they
realize that women continue to risk being “othered” through
technologies, including Internet technologies. But the TPEC’s
use of Woolfian and other critical screens to examine culture
are creating a new reality in which they resist oppression and
claim their own space and place in western culture.
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Woolf and Women as a Sex

Susan Gubar asks in her introduction to A Room of One’s Own
(2005), “How does this . . . affirmation of art inform Virginia
Woolf’s approach to sexuality and to the much discussed ideal of
androgyny” (lvi)? Gubar elucidates Woolf’s attention to
sexuality and gender issues and points to one of Woolf’s primary
arguments in so many of her texts: in patriarchy, women, as a
sex 3 are nearly always defined by what they are NOT or what they
lack in relationship to men. Further, women are an astoundingly
often-treated subject in the works of men. Woolf continuously
calls out the mistakes made by centuries of men who have defined
the sex “women” incorrectly and, quite frankly, badly! For
example, Woolf asks, “Have you any notion of how many books are
written about women in the course of one year? Have you any
notion how many are written by men? Are you aware that you are,
perhaps, the most discussed animal in the universe” (Woolf 2005
26)? Moreover, Woolf assertively recognizes that “men . . .
have no apparent qualification save that they are not women . .

3

I use the term sex because that is the term most often used by Woolf—today,
I would opt for the term gender, but cultural influences have irrevocably
changed the way westerners interpret these words, so I want to try to at
least invoke the spirit of Woolf’s terminology, even if the effect is not
completely realized.
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.” and that “many [books that were written about women] . . .
were serious and prophetic, moral and hortatory” (27).
But, it is when she remarks, “Why are women . . . so much
more interesting to men than men are to women?” (27) that she
uncovers a key difference among the sexes in how they approach
interactions with each other. She further writes, “Men were no
longer to her ‘the opposing faction’; she need not waste her
time railing against them; she need not climb on to the roof and
ruin her peace of mind longing for travel, experience and a
knowledge of the world and character that were denied her” (91).
In other words, when women began to take up the pen, they wrote
about the more important and interesting subjects to them, were
decidedly not patronizing to men, and were disinterested in
wasting the valuable, short periods of time they had for writing
with speculations about the opposite sex. Woolf realized that
women who write understand that the exercise of writing
explanations of the opposite sex is futile and a waste of
everyone’s time; she wrote, “Here I drew a breath and added,
indeed, in the margin, Why does Samuel Butler say, ‘Wise men
never say what they think of women?’ Wise men never say anything
else apparently . . . what is so unfortunate is that wise men
never think the same thing about women” (Woolf 2005 29).
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An example of how this phenomenon remains evident in the
current context of the Internet is provided on the Web site
Jezebel.com. This Web site states that it is “celebrity, sex,
fashion for women: without airbrushing” (Jezebel 2010). In a
post by Hortense Smith, Jezebel revealed that the magazine Men’s
Health recently included a feature article, ostensibly written
by a woman of authority, about “25 Secrets She Wishes You Knew.”
Among the “secrets” were gems such as “Manicures and pedicures
are a woman's gift to her man. I love looking pretty for you.
The time to worry is when I stop going for them.” I could engage
Woolf’s arguments with this type of writing about women on many
levels, including its assumptions of heteronormativity, that
women do nothing for themselves except when it comes to an end
that pleases a man, that women who do not get manis and pedis
are assumed to be not heterosexual and therefore undesirable
even amongst themselves. I could go on. But while Jezebel uses
this post as a forum for discussion on the misguided topics
featured in men’s magazines, in doing so, it also reveals the
significance of the difference between the content of media
outlets such as Men’s Health and its own. In reviewing
approximately two hundred posts under the section on “sex” on
Jezebel.com, the posts that were about men or relationships with
men were similar to this one in that they exposed men’s media
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outlets for their inherent misogyny and lack of insight into
women. In the “sex” section of Jezebel.com, at least, women
write far more often about what interests women, and most of the
time, that interest does not involve trying to elucidate
explanations of the male human as a species.
From the viewpoint that discussing men and women as
separate, distinct, and profoundly different sexes is an
exercise in futility, Woolf explicitly unravels her
groundbreaking ideas about sexuality in A Room of One’s Own
(2005), but she takes the ideas further, in more stylistic ways,
in the semi-autobiographical, semi-fictional, somewhat magically
realistic Orlando. In my view, the treatment of sexuality in A
Room of One’s Own (2005) is a sort of explanation for what, in
retrospect, she had accomplished in writing Orlando, which had
been published the year prior. For example, Woolf wrote,
“perhaps, to think, as I had been thinking these two days, of
one sex as distinct from the other is an effort. It interferes
with the unity of the mind” (Woolf 2005 95). Yet again, the
transgression that is enacted by Woolf’s sex, sexuality, and
gender screen illustrates the profundity of her realization that
there may indeed be no essential, organic, biological
distinction between the sexes, save, perhaps, for actual sexual
organs, in the case of most humans.
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Gubar notes Woolf’s contemplation of the differences
between the sexes. Woolf pondered, “Different though the sexes
are, they intermix” (Gubar 2005 189). And Gubar further observes
that, “particularly toward the conclusion of A Room of One’s Own
(2005), this idea results in a meditation on androgyny, though
throughout Woolf could be said to be grappling with issues of
sexuality” with “some interpreting it as a renunciation of
sexuality altogether” (Woolf 2005 lvii). And I agree with Gubar
that “A Room of One’s Own (2005) is an effort to transcend the
partiality and competition of binary terms (like male and
female) so as to arrive at “liberating moments of resonant being
available to men as well as women” (Woolf 2005 lviii). Woolf
continues to screen culture through the lens of sex, sexuality,
and gender by rejecting the rigidity of binary behavior, delving
even into the area of race relationships.
The argument over the decades that European and U.S.
feminism has historically been racist and exclusionary to women
of color is not a new one. And what can even be seen here in
Woolf’s writing is that she acknowledges the difficulty of
living in a culture that devalues certain races of color, and
she equates those ways of thinking with the devaluation of women
that she so keenly experiences herself and observes in other
ways. And because of her own experiences and the experiences of
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other women (she often wrote of her concern for the poor) within
patriarchal culture, she illustrates yet another shift between
the inherent domination-submission paradigm of patriarchy and
the more egalitarian feminist approach to societal matters. For
example, Woolf writes, “it is one of the great advantages of
being a woman that one can pass even a very fine negress without
wishing to make an Englishwoman of her” (Woolf 2005 50). In
other words, in Woolf’s view, there is nothing wrong with or
less-than in a woman of color who may have different mannerisms,
features, comportment, or cultural ideals. But the effects
produced by so many years of patriarchal English colonialism
throughout the world that have affected and established norms in
contemporary English society have produced the superior
attitudes that prevail as she writes, and many of which persist
today in U.S. culture.
The Web site Jezebel.com confronts majority societal
criticism and rejection of homosexuality and androgyny on a
regular basis. For example, since 2008, the Web site posted
nineteen items that dealt directly with androgyny, some of which
are posted below. Included in those postings was one particular
item of note that focuses on the androgyny of the actor who
played Orlando in the film adaptation of Woolf’s Orlando. The
contributors to Jezebel.com are continuing the important TPEC
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work of screening sex, sexuality, and gender societal constructs
and transgressing lines of assumption based on them to move
forward the cultural discussion of the meanings of gender (see
Figure 3-7).

Figure 3: A sample Jezebel.com post on androgyny
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Figure 4: A sample Jezebel.com post on androgyny
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Figure 5: A sample Jezebel.com post on androgyny
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Figure 6: Jezebel.com post on Tilda Swinton's androgyny

87

Figure 7: Further discussion on Tilda Swinton's androgyny
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Further, Woolf adopts a much more liberal view of what some
may term alternative lifestyles, even among Englishmen and
women, and she asserts in many ways throughout A Room of One’s
Own (2005) and her other work that homosexuality and androgyny
are not abhorrent or wrong, but completely natural, acceptable,
and inevitable. She first observes this relationship among women
in A Room of One’s Own (2005) when she cites what many readers,
including the young women to whom she was lecturing, may have
passed over completely in the work of author Mary Carmichael.
Woolf keenly observes in Carmichael’s work a change in the tenor
and tone of meaning in Carmichael’s brief sentence “Chloe liked
Olivia.” Woolf writes, ”I may tell you that the very next words
I read were these—‘Chloe liked Olivia . . .’ Do not start. Do
not blush. Let us admit in the privacy of our own society that
these things sometimes happen. Sometimes women do like women”
(81). And Woolf continues, “’Chloe liked Olivia,’ I read. And
then it struck me how immense a change was there. Chloe liked
Olivia perhaps for the first time in literature” (81). With this
passage, Woolf begins to directly address the importance of
writing for women—writing for writing’s sake, yes, but also
writing for the promotion of feminist ideals. Her assertion that
such a simple phrase in a literary work can carry such weight
and importance for women clarifies how critical she believes
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writing to be for women. The example she uses, “Chloe liked
Olivia,” also demonstrates how very impactful and meaningful
only a few choice words can be, a concept which resonates deeply
with me as I draw meaning from Woolf’s way of screening sex,
sexuality, and gender to analyze the power of current-era
digitally-produced, often abbreviated, activist technological
texts.
I respect Woolf’s attention to the mood of a phrase, the
tone of an idea, and the absolute importance of a relatively
simple statement, and I speculate that some Facebook status
updates engender a similar impact. For example, in a discussion
post on the Facebook account “Feminism is important to the 21st
Century, fifteen-year-old JillAnn Meunier wrote, “I'm 15, but if
I had known the word feminist when I was a toddler, I would have
been one then, too.” And in another discussion thread on the
same account, Chris O’Leary wrote, “why don’t we all just call
ourselves equalists?” On some level, these posts touch on some
very important feminist issues such as how to get around the
negative “f-word” syndrome associated with the word feminism
that leads the mainstream public to think of feminists as manhaters. For example, in U.S. culture, most people assume that
toddlers are pure and that they have not yet been too deeply
corrupted by the politics of their parents or the cultural
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expectations of their environment. Yet this young woman seems to
indicate rather profoundly that she could think for herself and
perform her identity, despite a limited vocabulary, at a very
young age. And therefore, if one agrees that toddlers are
relatively pure in mind and heart, this young woman knew at the
age of three or younger that she was a feminist and that she
knew that she was equal to any other toddler. It’s a very
simple, but quite provocative statement that raises all sorts of
questions. When do children begin to know the cultural
expectations of being a girl or a boy? How do they know them?
Who teaches them and how do they learn or not learn to rely on
their own thoughts and ideas to establish their world view? Is
it possible to NOT learn cultural norms or to reject them at
such an early age? These questions are complicated by the
evolution of “post feminism,” which is a culture-based opinion
held by many women who are currently in their twenties. Woolf
herself was troubled by the emergence of the word “feminism,”
which came into common use during her lifetime. She actually
denied that she was a feminist, preferring at some moments to be
called a “Sapphist” and at others to refute her identity as
either, though she continued to live, write, and love in very
feminist ways. Perhaps it is not the term itself that is
operative for millennials nor Woolf but the perceived
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patriarchal cultural negativity associated with it. The TPEC
also resists labels by

being simultaneously human and machine,

flesh and ether, technology-enabled and technology-restricted.
Therefore, TPECs may be able to transcend boundaries selfimposed or imposed upon them by a culture that changes more
slowly than they.
Woolf’s work and these Web sites, blogs, and Facebook
accounts offer commentary and suggestions that address some of
these questions and illuminate some of the ways women in 21st
Century digital environments are applying feminist principles to
the subject matter of their writing.

Gender and Writing

In her work, Woolf identifies some key characteristics of
feminist writing that prevail to this day and that can guide the
TPEC and other feminist textual activists in the 21st century who
use different devices and mechanisms for feminist technological
textuality but who nonetheless observe and manipulate texts in
various forms to promote the valuable ideals of feminism. For
Woolf, a feminist writer is someone who uses “both sides of his
mind equally” (Woolf 2005 102). And she even refers to the fact
that some of the west’s most revered writers, those revered by
92

men and women and by many cultures, employed this approach to
writing. She remarked, for example, “the obvious reason would be
that it is natural for the sexes to cooperate” (Woolf 2005 96)
in two ways: first, in the sense that the male and female
aspects of a writer can manifest to produce extremely powerful
and influential literature, and second, in the sense that men
and women should influence each other’s writing for the benefit
of the writing, and if they do so, the writing that results will
be more compelling and meaningful. But Woolf pushes this
assertion even deeper by citing Shakespeare’s work. She states
that “one must turn back to Shakespeare, then, for Shakespeare
was androgynous” (Woolf 2005 102) and that “it is fatal for
anyone who writes to think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man
or woman pure and simple. One must be woman-manly or manwomanly” (103).
Finally, it is this woman-manly or man-womanly approach to
writing that I am so grateful to Woolf for observing and to
today’s feminist textual activists for using to promote feminist
ideals and influence cultural change.
The second example above by Chris O’Leary also
intentionally or unintentionally disrupts culturally-ingrained
thought paradigms by changing the vocabulary of feminism and
also transgressing gender boundaries. First and second wave
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feminists may argue that there is nothing wrong with the term
feminist and those who disagree with or are uncomfortable with
the word should just get over it, stop apologizing for it, or
stop looking for an escape from it to appease newer generations
of women or “post-feminists.” But what is disruptive about the
suggestion of using the term “equalist” is not just the word
itself. Part of the disruption occurs because the person who
posted the suggestion could be a man or a woman—the name is
Chris O’Leary. Chris has a non-gender specific photo on her or
his Facebook account and has concealed his or her gender. As an
audience to this statement, the reader can’t automatically
identify by gender with man or woman. Chris O’Leary may not have
intended to write such a profound thought, but in writing it,
Chris accomplished something similar to what Mary Carmichel
accomplished by writing “Chloe liked Olivia,” and in doing so
prompted the people who read it to think and to write at least
several more pages of comments on this discussion thread. While
I do not take up a detailed discussion of the Chris O’Leary post
in this dissertation, I acknowledge that Chris may have
expressed a term, “equalist,” that might help to resolve to some
extent the culturally problematic term “feminist.”
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CHAPTER 4: AESTHETICS AS A SCREEN
Women have served all these centuries
as looking-glasses possessing the magic
and delicious power of reflecting
the figure of man at
twice its natural size
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005)

Defining Woolfian and TPEC Aesthetics

Historically, the term aesthetics has been difficult to
define because it inevitably involves descriptors that are not
objective or concrete. Aesthetics is also a difficult term
because it is used across disciplines in different ways. As
Adorno stated, “it is self-evident that nothing concerning art
is self-evident” (1997). I agree, and I would also argue that
“aesthetics” is a meta-term that contains within it a multitude
of meanings that refer to itself and to other very closely
related concepts such as values, senses, feelings, and
perceptions.
I use the term aesthetics in this dissertation as a way of
describing what is valued in terms of feelings, perceptions, and
senses in contemporary U.S. culture. My stance on aesthetics is
that dominant cultural aesthetics in the U.S. privilege
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patriarchal values and that TPECs reject many of these values
and re-use them for their own purposes.
Primarily, I describe the term aesthetics as a gendered
concept. In patriarchy, male aesthetics are privileged, and some
of those privileges are expressed in binarial concepts such as
dominant/submissive, male/female and man/woman,
dominant/submissive, educated/uneducated, intelligent/ignorant,
etc. These are aesthetic privileges that Woolf and the TPEC
reject. One way that I take up an analysis of patriarchal
aesthetics is by looking at embodiment in terms of seeing the
human body as a machine. Following Woolf’s views on the value of
androgyny, I move the idea further by analyzing the binarial
notion of human/machine by acknowledging that humans in western
culture are becoming human-machine, their embodiment
incorporating human and technological characteristics that are
no longer disassemblable prostheses, but fully embodied
aesthetic features.
The following Woolfian aesthetic principles apply also to
the TPEC.
o Woolf’s aesthetics recognize the writer as creator as
well as collaborator with her audience and reader.
Woolfian aesthetics and TPEC aesthetics are
collaborative.
o Woolf’s aesthetics are negotiable when it comes to
space and place within and outside of texts. TPECs
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bodily and intellectually enact negotiations between
space and place and within and outside of texts and
technological environments.
o Woolf’s aesthetics are relational, a give and take,
strong and weak, male and female, man and woman, basic
and abundant—not binarial. The TPEC performs a
spectrum of embodiments that are negotiable depending
on context, environment, or even whim.
o Woolf’s aesthetics do not privilege patriarchal values
such as individualism, colonialism, power,
naturalizing, etc., but do privilege networks,
connectives, affinities, experience. The TPEC embraces
an identity that is fluid, connected through people,
ideas, machines, and environment, and values personal
experience as well as paid or scientific expertise.
TPECs participate in refashioning western cultural
aesthetic perceptions of identity, individuality,
interconnectedness, relationships, and power by participating in
and influencing the aesthetics of textual technologies. For
example, later, I describe in greater detail how computer
technology is aesthetically masculine and therefore contains
inherent patriarchal aesthetics. The same hierarchies valued by
patriarchal culture are replicated in technological/digital
tools. But the TPEC subverts these influences by re-using and
refashioning the textual technological tools to further a
feminist agenda.
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The History of Gendered Aesthetics

Technologies, especially since the industrial revolution,
have been and continue to be gendered, and they are gendered
because they developed in patriarchal social and economic
systems. In particular, computer technology is inherently
masculine. This fact can be demonstrated by surveying the
historical underpinnings of technological developments,
examining the various approaches that feminist theories have
taken toward computer technology, and finally, by situating
Virginia Woolf’s work relative to this position and describing
how women are using Internet technologies to increase their
personal and collective agency.
Walter Ong, in Orality and Literacy (1982), took a position
on the nature of technology. Contrary to technological
determinists, some cyberfeminists, and others, Ong believes that
technologies develop in concert with cultural needs and desires,
and technologies are used by cultures as vehicles that enable
users to accomplish things that they could not accomplish with
earlier technologies. Additionally, Ong refers to the nature of
the human-machine interaction that occurs with computer
technology, insisting that computers are not mere appendages or
external prostheses that assist human life, and that computers
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have actually become so ingrained in human life that they are,
in Ong’s terms, a form of secondary orality. He states, “The
electronic age is also an age of ‘secondary orality’, the
orality . . . which depends on writing and print for existence”
(3). In my view, this means that transitional western digital
society, in which textual (print and other texts) technologies
are ever-present and becoming embodied aspects of identities,
depends on technology for its very existence, and the new
technologies that develop and continue to improve on each other
depend on each other for their very existence. This is one
reason why the millennial generation mentioned earlier, having
grown up knowing nothing of pre-Internet culture, is hesitant to
embrace a pre-digital cultural ideal of silence and isolation
that does not include technological, “always on” textual
technologies.
The complexity and multitude of forces that influence
decisions, developments, and uses of technologies have outgrown
the relatively simplistic conceptualizations of technologies
proposed by the determinists, and feminist scholars denounce
theories that are completely linear because linearity assumes a
hierarchical progression of binarial notions such as first/last,
top/bottom, lowest/highest, etc. Further, as cognitive
scientists have studied the brain over centuries and especially
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within the most recent one, they have discovered the phenomenal
intimacy of the brain’s synapses and neurological connections,
and the remarkable adaptability of humankind’s most valuable
organ. They realize that forces such as culture, environment and
many others impact the development of all humans (Varela,
Thompson & Rosch 1991) and the machines, technologies, and tools
they choose to use.
But because of the way the scientific humanists and others
had ingrained into western culture the idea that the body is a
machine, made of parts, dissassemblable and reassemblable, heatgenerating and forceful, the male-dominated world of science has
made the contention believable that the human body is not only
machine, but it is process, a complicated computer, but
decipherable if we can just break down the codes that inscribe
it.
I believe that there has been a major shift in the
development of computing for personal purposes in the 21st
century because it is now possible to envision the computerized
body (quite literally through medical technology and other
technologies that increasingly make the body transparent) as not
just an appendage or a prosthesis, but an integral part of the
TPEC cyborgs we are becoming, it is not out of our reach to
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continue to develop cultural norms that acknowledge the
complexities of the mind/body/machine.
My views on the aesthetic nature of computers and the body
are informed by feminist texts such as Woolf (1982, 2005),
Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999, 2002), Balsamo (1999), and many
others. Additionally, by looking at the historical positions
taken to analyze the ways that technologies develop, I connect
some of western culture’s understandings of technological
(especially computer) developments with the more recent
theorization and study of the brain and mind through cognitive
science. For example, Bolter’s idea in Writing Space (2001) is
remediation. Remediation, Bolter argues, means that new
technologies incorporate aspects of former technologies into
them. The newer technologies can carry with them remnants of
what was good and what worked from the older technologies. In
other words, technologies don’t just spontaneously invent
themselves and get taken up by a culture—they emerge based on
what the culture uses, what the culture needs, and what the
technology promises is possible. Likewise, through studying even
the most basic historical positions on cognitive development, we
know that those theorists have espoused stage theories such as
infancy, childhood, middle childhood, adolescence, etc., terms
that have been commonly accepted for a long time. It is not
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difficult to see the similarities in the ways the technology
theories and cognitive theories have moved in similar
directions: from distinct and separated to embodied, from
universality to differentiation, from linear to circular and
fluid. Bolter’s stance that multiple forces create environments
in which certain applications or aspects of technologies can
flourish is more progressive than the stringent, restrictive
ideas of technological determinism, such as technology driving
social developments and cultural pathways. Likewise, newer
cognitive theories such as those of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
(1991), that include a multiplicity and complexity of influences
on the brain’s development further develop formerly linear,
rigidly categorical theories of human development. Similarly,
through Internet technology, TPEC activists create communities
that are not bound by the formerly restrictive notions of home,
community, religious affiliation, the body, or territoriality.
In summary, the Internet is a complex interaction of social
forces that is especially informed by patriarchy, codes,
hardware, prostheses, embodiment, and other factors that make
its isolation as an object of study impracticable. One must
consider all of these forces and more when analyzing the
aesthetics of TPEC feminist technological textuality in the 21st
Century.
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The Historical Aesthetics of Women and Technology

Earlier, pre-capitalist societies that were not
industrialized were less hierarchical and were, as Kilbourne &
Weeks (2002) stated, “based on cooperation rather than
competition, community rather than self-interest, and usufruct
(the right to use of another’s property)” (245). These precapitalist societal norms, while they may be problematic in some
other ways for women, hold closer to a feminist mindset than do
most capitalist ideals such as individualism, colonialism, power
dynamics, and the tendency to naturalize whatever the (white)
male majority prioritizes as aesthetic, desirable, or worthy. I
do not denounce capitalism entirely, however, because in my
view, capitalism has a role to play in women’s potential to
realize the admonitions of Virginia Woolf and to earn their own
money and enjoy their own spaces/places in whatever tangible or
intangible forms that serve that purpose. Ultimately, Web pages,
Facebook accounts, and blogs offer new frontiers for women that
have the potential to transform women’s lives by increasing
their personal and collective agency outside of the realm of
rhetorics and relationships based on power and domination and
inside the arena of networks, communities, affinities, and paid
103

or unpaid work based on collectives instead of competition. To
be clear, mine is not an essentialist stance, but I do recognize
and acknowledge that women have been deeply enculturated through
patriarchy to behave in certain ways that make them, somewhat
ironically, very well suited for Internet technologies that work
using these concepts.
Some of the earliest historical groupings of humans are
genders (Kilbourne & Weeks 245). So, division among human beings
according to gender is nothing new. But pre-capitalist societies
tended toward gender groupings because social networks were
based on the tasks that were typically completed by one gender
or the other, such as men conducting civil affairs and women
managing domestic ones. Important to note, however, is that some
current-culture “women’s work,” such as laundry, ironing, and
other now domesticated tasks, were formerly industrialized jobs
performed by men who earned pay for doing them. One difference
between then and now, however, is that after the division of
types of labor by genders and the domestication of many of these
jobs, such as laundry, the types of labor themselves were
regarded equally in terms of respectability and importance. Once
women’s domestic work became individualized, home-bound, and
unpaid, it was devalued by the culture and the technologies
themselves that ostensibly liberated and eased workloads
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(Kilbourne & Weeks). But the technological “advancements” such
as in-home laundry were products of the emerging hierarchies of
patriarchal capitalism that resulted in the preoccupation and
predominance of class rhetorics that are so embedded as to be
nearly invisible in western cultures today. Since the industrial
revolution, the most used (and for a long time most respected)
social, literary, and other criticisms have analyzed class and
have lost track of the criticism of patriarchy, except in
relatively small and specialized fields such as women’s studies
and feminist studies (of course Marxism is probably the most
famous analysis of class). The switch from valuing the “organic,
female world view” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246) to revering the
mechanical and sanctioning the scientific and material control
and domination of nature and women is key to the “entrenchment
of patriarchy” (Kilbourne & Weeks 246).
So, fast-forward a bit from the previously described
masculine turn in worldview to the more recent but
scientifically-related developments in computer technologies,
and one can see the small step it takes to connect the values of
entrenched and naturalized patriarchy with computer technology.
In fact, the first computers were developed through experiments
that were funded by U.S. and other western governments to
produce better and more efficient war tactics for the military,
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so the agenda of patriarchal domination of information and
information systems and masculine values are inextricably
imbedded in computer technology. Studies have also shown that
women not only contend with the ubiquitous patriarchy of the
technology itself, they must also overcome discriminatory
stereotypes that label them technologically incompetent,
uninterested, or unworthy. The Facebook account “Feminism is
Important to the 21st Century” posted Figure 8 on its page. This
political cartoon graphically portrays Woolf’s and many other
feminist’s views about patriarchal aesthetics as a silent,
assumed, ingrained part of current U.S. culture and history.
Woolf (2005) opined about government-sponsored and commissioned
works on history that “by no possible means could middle-class
women with nothing but brains and character at their command
have taken part in any one of the great movements which, brought
together, constitute the historian’s view of the past” (44). In
other words, she seemed to be one of few who noticed that women
were absent from history as it was recorded. And she noted how
far from the truth those histories must have been, knowing her
own intelligence and opinions and those of her contemporaries in
spite of their lack of formal education and “place” at the
proverbial table of serious discussion.
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Figure 8: Feminist political comic posted on Feminism is
Important to the 21st Century Facebook account

Further, as Bryson (1996) argues, “women live,
paradoxically, in a state of intimate connection with
technologies of re-/production and yet are represented as
perennially inadequate—groping towards and never reaching
competence—technophobic and Luddite” (121). But most feminists
would not argue that women should retreat to the essentialist
state of earth mother who is devoid of mechanical, scientific,
and computer knowledges to escape patriarchal domination. In
fact, it may be that computer technology among other high107

technologies “may be necessary for women’s autonomy” (Smith 13),
and, we should not underestimate women’s ability to subvert
underlying motives.

Feminist Critiques of the Aesthetics of Computer Technology

Women users of computer technology have been studied and
theorized about by feminists. Further, women have been
positioned by these theories relative to their use of computer
technology (as opposed to its influence on them in the
workplace, or the influence of its design on them, for example).
Liberal feminists tend to focus on the fact that most
computer technologists are men, and therefore they create
systems and programs that reflect male perspectives and values
and ignore those that are valuable to women. Liberal feminists
point to, as I stated earlier, the military origins of computer
technology, but they also note that one of the women-friendly
aspects of Internet technology is that the Internet is based on
networks (originally fashioned to prevent military attacks on a
singular, nuclear center of military knowledge/power) (Misa
2004), and because western women have been socialized to and are
adept at network-style relationships, aesthetics, and modes of
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understanding, women may enjoy an advantage when it comes to
using the Internet.
Socialist feminists

such as Wajcman, Eisenstein,

Ehrenreich, and Enloe, argue that the direction that computer
technologies have taken is a direct result of capitalist
interests and profit margins (Rosser 4) and that those motives
move the decisions about developments even further away from the
public realm (government-funded) into the private. But their
concern is deeper than this simplified statement: there is a
complex and often hidden relationship between publicly-funded
research and privately held patents, copyrights, and other
intellectual properties that cannot be easily sorted out. The
basic thing that is at stake for socialist feminists is access—
who gets to use and who gets to benefit from government-funded
technological developments that get privatized, and therefore
owned, in this way?
There are similarities among womanist, African American,
and radical feminist theories about computer technologies. Some
African American and womanist feminists, for example, insist
that gender, class, race, differing abilities, and other factors
should be considered when technologies are developed for users.
They ask that scientists consider “how and under what conditions
the technology will be used” (Rosser 6) and that the consumer of
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the technology be included in the design and shape of the
product (a form of stakeholder review). Radical feminists, in a
similar way, might agree that users should help design
technologies according to their needs and wishes, but they might
also say that doing so is not possible for women because
maleness, masculinity, and patriarchy are so “intertwined with
technology and computer systems in our society” (Rosser 11) that
no woman-centered technology could possibly exist within that
framework. All three of these feminisms might agree that it is
very difficult to imagine computer technology that is premised
on cooperation, collaboration, and working with nature (instead
of controlling or dominating it), though there are examples of
computer technologies that lean in this direction, such as
wikis, shareware, and open source applications.
Finally, in a related way, postmodern feminists might argue
that the fluid nature of women’s identities requires computer
technologies that are inclusive and relevant to the wide variety
of constructions of women that exist. Therefore, women’s
participation in the design and use of technologies is important
to ensuring that their needs are addressed by the technologies
they must use. Women in different contexts react to, embrace or
reject, and use or ignore technologies for many reasons that are
based on race, class, age, parental status, and other
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considerations. The problem for postmodern feminists is
universalism—in some respects, any computer technology has to be
universalized to some degree so that as many users as possible
can access and benefit from it, but in making technology this
way, it always-already excludes a great number of people who do
not belong to the paradigm that informed the decisions and
influenced the creation of it.
One of the newest, most exciting forms of feminism has
sprung directly out of computer and Internet technology:
Cyberfeminism. Cyberfeminism is a woman-centered perspective
that “advocates women’s use of new information and
communications technologies for empowerment” (Millar 200) and
that positions these technologies as “inherently liberatory”
(Millar 200) because women are “uniquely suited to life in the
digital age” (Millar 200) and because of the reasons I have
mentioned earlier, such as their socialization toward
relationships, networking, and community-building. These
socializations, or enculturations have become part of the
western female aesthetic. TPECs tend to favor relational
constructs, networked affinities, and membership in communities
over unarguable truths or facts, boundaries, and individualistic
ideals.
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In summary, various feminist theories have addressed the
question of computer technology. Like them, I acknowledge the
problems inherent in trying to establish a route for women to
take so that they may gain personal and collective agency for
writing and other creative pursuits by using the Internet. But I
also find promise in the Internet’s unintended consequences,
such as an aesthetic prioritizing of relational constructs,
networked affinities, and membership in communities, that may
create opportunities for women to flourish and make their
situations better by using it.

Social Science, Women, and Technology

Some social scientists who study texts and technology
contend that the trajectory that Internet technology is taking
is centered in many ways around its forms of social interaction
among users. I agree. Many pre-computer age foundational texts
by social critics such as Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, and
others laid the ground work for examining technological
phenomena from myriad points of entry. Feminist scholars have
added to the literature about the sociality of Internet
technologies. Many fields of study intersect and divulge
critical junctures in the development of the technology itself
112

as well as the development of the ways TPECs use it for feminist
technological textuality.
One of the areas of conjuncture among the various fields
that are concerned about technology is the phenomenon of
globalization. Globalization, in my view, especially in the
sense of a “shrinking world” would not be possible without the
aid of computer technologies. Theorists such as Appadurai (1996)
and Tabb (2002) question the tsunami-like force of neo-liberal
globalization on the world and its people. They ask what is at
stake for marginalized cultures that cannot, because of internal
struggles and/or state indebtedness, among other reasons,
participate and compete in the global information economy; and
they inquire about the social responsibility of the purveyors of
the neo-liberal globalization machine. Among the world’s poorest
and most deprived people are women and children, so the
intensely stratifying effects of neo-liberal globalization often
have greater consequences for women in terms of access, poverty,
hunger, and mobility. And even in westernized, globally powerful
nations such as the United States, women are becoming the
majority of the population, and thus have a greater stake in
issues from the personal to the global.
Appadurai (1996) and Tabb (2002), among others, also
question more conservative theorists, such as Thomas Friedman,
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who argue that forces such as global capitalism, which is in
many ways driven by technology and digitally-instantaneous flows
of immense amounts of money, have a flattening effect on the
world and that the flattening contributes to a trickle-down of
economic gain, among other benefits such as access to
technologies, for nearly everyone . . . eventually. Manual
Castells, who is a sociologist by training, also writes about
the effects of being perpetually available via communication
devices such as cell phones and PDAs and how information
literacy is a commodity in the global world. But he questions
this commodity’s steep price--cultural hegemony and false
notions of prosperity that can’t be reconciled with other
realities such as high unemployment rates, dangerous employment
situations (especially such as women in sweat shops), lack of
medical and social services, and in many cases, lack of basic
infrastructures such as roads and clean water. Technology is
intricately tied up with ‘development’ that often adversely
affects women.
Sherry Turkle (1999), an anthropological sociologist from
MIT, offers another set of questions about humans, texts, and
technology. Her questions often revolve around what she
perceives as a change in the way people understand their
identities once cyber technology becomes a factor. Her computer
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metaphor for this change refers to identity as being “recast in
terms of multiple windows and parallel lives” (643). The change
comes from the “fact that self-presentation is written in text”
and “means that there is time to reflect upon and edit one’s
‘composition’” (643). And her concern with this paradigm shift
is that “the self no longer simply plays different roles in
different settings—something that people experience, when, for
example, one wakes up as a lover, makes breakfast as a mother,
and drives to work as a lawyer” (644). In other words, and in
this example she does refer explicitly to women, a woman can be
all of these identities (or more) at one time by virtue of
cyberspace texts and technology, but doing so can have profound
psychological and material effects. In essence, the texts become
the identities. And the notion of identity(ies) as texts, though
more recent in the context of computers and the Internet, is not
new: Those foundational theorists that I mentioned earlier were
all about the embodiment of a person’s life texts. For example,
in reference to Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Turkle
(1979) argues that his point was “in order to put into question
assumptions deeply embedded in our ordinary language, one has to
use language in extraordinary ways” (94). In my view, studying
texts and their influence by, on, and within technologies, is
one way that women can participate in refashioning western
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cultural aesthetics perceptions of identity, individuality,
interconnectedness, relationships, and power. Ultimately, these
are the aspects of society that continue to perplex the TPEC and
that continue to be addressed by feminist textual technological
activists who host Web sites, use Facebook accounts, and write
blogs.
One of the biggest issues for the TPEC feminist textual
technological activist is embodiment. And although I wrote about
the issues surrounding embodiment in Chapter One, I return to it
here because embodiment is always-already connected to gender.
In particular, women’s bodies have been coerced, co-opted, used,
marginalized, and dismissed throughout history in many ways, but
the ways in which they are so affected by technologies and the
rhetoric and texts that surround the technologies are
particularly important. N. Katherine Hayles (1999) does not shy
away from this complicated subject. Hayles, like me, is excited
about the possibilities of a cyborg (posthuman, to use her term,
and TPEC, to use mine) future for women. She states, “the
posthuman evokes the exhilarating prospect of getting out of
some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about
what being human means” (285). Hayles also cites scholars in
fields such as cognitive science and psychology who have argued
that information technologies have contributed just as much as
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any other factor in shaping contemporary worldviews and brain
function (284). In the ways mentioned above, the theories of
aesthetics, social science, psychology, and other disciplines
complement feminist theories for a critical examination of the
embodiment and spaces involved with writing in digital culture
shed a lot of light on how the TPEC will evolve in and with
cyberculture.
Further, Anne Balsamo (1999), questions the ways in which
technologies, especially computer technologies, affect and have
been affected by the organic bodies of women. She pursues such
issues as the rationalization of new body technologies as “lifeenhancing and even life-saving” (5), especially through popular
culture and the media. She argues that, though many technologies
that affect bodies, especially the bodies of women, such as many
modern-era kitchen appliances and in-home laundry machines, are
purported to be time-saving, life-saving, and liberating, the
same technologies are also used to re-assert domination over
women by male-dominated culture, norms, and institutions.
Technologies such as the ones listed above ostensibly liberate
women from more labor-intensive versions of the same work, but
within that liberation is the continued assumption that the work
should be unpaid, home-bound, and restricted to the women for
whom they were made. In other words, the work is “easier,” so
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women should shut up and stop complaining. Balsamo (1999)
indicates that, despite technological advances, especially those
of the past five decades, women continue to be confined to
restrictive roles and viewed as primarily reproductive bodies.
Balsamo (1999) asserts that “Gender, in this schema, is both a
determining cultural condition and a social consequence of
technological deployment” (9). Balsamo (1999) claims that
certain technologies “serve to reinforce traditional gendered
patterns of power and authority” (10), and I think that she
believes that becoming cyborgs is inevitable for women and all
humans. However, if the inevitable is to happen, Balsamo (1999),
similarly to Hayles, insists that we have to come to terms with
how women’s bodies will maintain corporeal, “natural” (12)
functioning and also assert themselves in the discourses of
various technologies that affect them. Recognizing and
addressing at least these two aspects of the female body, in
Balsamo’s (1999) view, is critical to the future of women and
feminism. In fact, both Hayles and Balsamo refer to each other
in their work. Hayles’ (arguably) most influential text, My
Mother Was a Computer, and Balsamo’s Technologies of the
Gendered Body, describe to the clerical work called “computing”
that many young women as well as Balsamo’s mother performed.
Both refer to women as computers in metaphorical and literal
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terms. In these texts, writing theory, feminist theory, and
theories of texts and technology work closely together to
formulate new ways of approaching problematic cultural
assumptions.
Finally, the “question concerning technology” (Heidegger
1977), still plagues the complex nature of the Internet and
women’s interaction with it. In The Question Concerning
Technology, Heidegger is also concerned with essentialism in the
sense that, to him, “technology is not equivalent to the essence
of technology” (4). For the TPEC and feminist textual
technological activists, I believe that Heidegger means that
TPECs have to first uncover, reveal, or determine the underlying
social constructs and patriarchal aesthetics that define what is
meant by technology. In other words, technology is not simply an
instrument or a means of production, but its essence is a
construct itself of aesthetic expectations, societal values,
dominant cultural norms, patriarchal hierarchies, and other
influences. Whether the word that is used is epistemology,
techne, or any other name, the TPEC has to consider how it comes
to know what it knows and from what standpoint those truths are
formulated. The TPEC questions the texts, images, labels, media,
and other products of technology and challenges and alters
cultural aesthetic norms that marginalize, silence, and
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dominate. Ronald Deibert (1997) said that some of the most
monumental shifts in world order have been made because some
influence brought a marginalized practice to the center. As a
feminist, I know personally that remarkable transformation can
occur when the voices of the “Other” can be heard. The TPEC
activists analyzed in this dissertation are producing texts that
bring marginalized voices to the center and expose cultural
assumptions that can be misleading, prejudicial, and even
dangerous.

Situating Woolfian Aesthetics in an Historical Context

Susan Gubar remarks in her introduction to A Room of One’s
Own (2005) that Woolf identifies and emphasizes “the importance
of aesthetics: the talent or gift that it is death to hide, the
integrity of the work of art, the transformative capacities of
the imaginative faculty in readers and in writers” (Woolf 2005
liv). And Gubar goes on to note that,
Woolf places the aesthetic at the center of her discussion
of women’s issues not simply to evaluate the historical
factors that impeded female writers in the past; not simply
to criticize evaluative criteria that privilege the
subjects, styles, and genres mined by men over those
crafted by women; but to suggest the enduring vital
influence of novels, plays, and poems on their present and
future audiences (lvi).
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I cite these passages because they inform my arguments about the
aesthetics of today’s feminist textual activists. I clearly see
a connection between what Woolf observed about aesthetics and
what is happening today in the ways women use technology to
construct and assert their identities, artistic abilities,
contributions, and values in ways that change and enhance the
cultural aesthetics of the present and future. In the example
below, I explain further how the foundations of Woolf’s beliefs
about aesthetics are performed by marginalized people who use
technologies that Woolf may never have imagined would be
available to perform activist work. To frame this argument, I
draw on globalization theorist Appadurai’s (1996) notion of
‘scapes’ to illustrate the impact that Internet technologies
such as Facebook can have on not only personal, local subjects,
but importantly, on a global-level issue that affects women and
homosexual writers and readers, and, less directly, other
marginalized groups.
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The Aesthetics of Activist Scapes

Arjun Appadurai (1996) identifies five theoretical “scapes”
in his 1996 book, Modernity at Large, which I contend can be
applied to the phenomenon of women using technology to write in
activist ways. The first four scapes are mediascape, ideoscape,
ethnoscape, and financescape. The fifth scape, technoscape, in
my view, permeates all of the other scapes so inseparably that
it can no longer remain a stand-alone scape as Appadurai (1996)
initially identified it. In other words, the technoscape is a
common element throughout all scapes, and it is intimately
rather than marginally connected to all four. These four
technology-enhanced scapes show “fluid, irregular[ity]”
(Appadurai 33), which is an aesthetic quality of writing that
Woolf employed and that is present in the writing that women
perform using Internet-based technologies. Appadurai’s (1996)
scapes are a good tool for examining textual technologies’
influence on culture and the status of women in local and global
contexts.
Appadurai (1996) defines ethnoscapes as “the landscape of
persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live:
tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other
moving groups and individuals” (33). In addition, I would add to
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this list the broader category of women, who often make up the
majority of the immigrants, refugees, exiles, and guestworkers
that Appadurai (1996) categorizes. The ethnoscape also includes
those individuals, groups, and systems that would protect others
who have no voice or agency to protect themselves, and often
those people are women and children. The ethnoscape permeates
borders and shifts the power of economics and politics (which
are parts of the financescape) from the elite to the masses.
The Internet, as an ethnoscape system, connects the
ethnoscape with the technoscape to produce movement across
borders of all kinds—gender, class, and ethnicity, for example-and it provides mobility of collective voices through
technological textuality such as e-mail petitions that garner
virtual signatures and represent the voices of people who are
adversely affected by the actions of other people, corporations,
laws, and other potential oppressors.
In one excellent example of an activist techno-ethnoscape
at work, I cite the story of Minal Hajratwala, author of the
book Leaving India (2009)(see Figure 9). As a recently published
author, from time to time, Hajratwala would check Amazon.com for
the rankings of her book sales. One day, she tried to find her
book on Amazon.com and couldn’t. Later, friends of hers
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recounted that they had looked for her book on Amazon.com and
couldn’t find it either.

Figure 9: Leaving India by Minal Hajratwala

Leaving India (is a book about many aspects of Hajratwala’s
immigrant experience, and part of that experience is her coming
of age as an Indian lesbian. But that is a relatively small part
of the book overall, which deals with Indian history, culture,
and customs, as well as the more standard immigrant experience
fare. After some investigation, Hajratwala discovered that some
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Amazon.com reviewers of her book had tagged it as lesbian. That
in itself was no problem for her, but their doing so led
Amazon.com to flag the book “adult,” and relegate it to searches
only accessible to adults who are allowed to search for mature
material. In a second policy assault, her book was no longer
being ranked because of its place in the adult category.
Hajratwala’s book is by no stretch of the imagination
pornographic or obscene yet Amazon.com refused its customers
access to it based on the one word “lesbian” that appeared in
customer reviews.
Hajratwala went online and discovered that “she wasn't the
only lesbian and gay author to have this experience. It was even
affecting classics by James Baldwin and Virginia Woolf” (Sydell
2009). And soon, her experiences were chronicled in online fora
such as Facebook and Twitter. Sydell stated, “Hajratwala was one
of many authors who wrote about it on Facebook and this weekend,
it was all over Twitter” (Sydell 2009). Further, the Hajratwala
case, along with the cases of other authors to whom this had
happened, spurred an Internet-based activist campaign against
Amazon.com, which was flooded by complaint emails and petitions
from users who were against relegating contemporary authors as
well as authors of classic literature to adult-only searches.
Sydell went on to state that Christopher Rice, board chair of
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the Lambda Literary Foundation, claimed, “the reaction has been
something of a testament to Internet activism” (Sydell 2009)
that ultimately led Amazon.com to reverse its policy. And
although Amazon.com claimed to NPR that “it was an embarrassing
and ham-fisted catalog error,” as of April 2009, Amazon.com
officials stated that they are “fixing the problem” (Sydell
2009) and as of July 2010 they have adjusted their policy to
more carefully screen explicit content and not categorically
exclude gay material. The full back story of Hajratwala’s
experience can be found on her blog at
http://www.minalhajratwala.com/2009/04/amazon-and-invisibility/.
By moving the imaginative constructs that were made
possible by the ethno-technoscape into action, the Facebookinformed Amazon.com petitioners became a powerful “global force,
forever slipping in and through the cracks” (Appadurai 41) of
emerging, porously-bordered Internet technology. Through the
technologies of Facebook and Twitter, people who may have been
otherwise separated or limited by geography (nations as well as
states), able-embodiment, or marginalized because of their
sexuality, gained agency to affect change in corporate policy
and influence the global techno-financescape that Amazon.com
represents.
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According to Appadurai (1996), financescapes are “the very
complex fiscal and investment flows” (34) that link economies.
There is no doubt that Amazon.com is a global entity, and the
example of the Internet-based textual technological campaign
above shows how marginalized individuals can act as a likeminded group to affect the business practices of a global
financial conglomerate. Further, this example illustrates that
all of the scapes, including the financescape, can no longer be
separated from the technoscape—the activists in this Amazon.com
scenario literally embodied the techno-financescape of
contemporary culture to enact change. Additionally, the feminist
adage that the personal is political was also enacted here—and
expanded to the idea that the personal is techno-financial. Not
only were these individual authors’ livelihoods at stake because
of Amazon.com’s policy, but because of the global forum that
Amazon.com operates in, their actions affected a world-wide
corporate financial policy that has implications that far
outreach the individuals who performed the technological
textuality in this case.
Further, the Amazon.com example also entered the
mediascape, which, according to Appadurai (1996), refers to the
distribution of electronic capabilities that produce and
disseminate information, such as newspapers, magazines, books,
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television stations, and film-production studios, which are now
available throughout the world, and to the images of the world
created by these media (35). In this example, mediascapes freed
the imagination and allowed readers (or consumers of Amazon.com
products) and “others living in other places” (Appadurai 35) to
join together to develop an imagined community that held realworld power and influence.

As demonstrated above, mediascapes

worked in concert with technoscapes, overlapping and propelling
one another. In this example, mediascapes were facilitated
through technoscapes, the technologies that allow distribution
of information and imagination, to form the hybrid technomediascape. The activists’ imaginations helped them script a set
of ideals beyond the daily experiences of the individual (who
may or may not have labeled herself an activist in real life),
that became the impetus for “acquisition and movement” (36) in
the techno-media and techno-financescapes.
Appadurai (1996) attests that “Ideoscapes are also
concatenations of images, but they are often directly political
and frequently have to do with . . . ideologies and
“counterideologies” (36).

Additionally, the ideoscape and the

ethnoscape are linked by a conjuncture: The ideoscapes are
concerned with slippery terms such as “freedom, welfare, rights,
sovereignty, representation” (Appadurai 36). In the case above,
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a techno-ideoscape formed because of concerns over freedom,
rights, and representation. A powerful imag/e/in/nation produced
by the techno-ethnoscapes, techno-financescapes, technomediascapes and techno-ideoscapes of the Amazon.com case
resulted in activist success.

Cultural Aesthetics and Fluidity

Another observation that Woolf makes about aesthetics
occurs on a cultural level. She remarks in A Room of One’s Own
(2005) that “women have served all these centuries as lookingglasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting
the figure of man at twice its natural size” (35), and she
continues, “How is he to go on giving judgment, civilizing
natives, making laws, writing books, dressing up and
speechifying at banquets, unless he can see himself at breakfast
and at dinner at least twice the size he really is” (36)? And
further, while, in Woolf’s assessment, men have garnered all of
the authority to pronounce the courses and great accomplishments
of history, they have done so at the expense of women by not
acknowledging women’s roles in the development of the world
except in the cases of the most famous of queens and great
ladies. Woolf remarks that there are nearly no historical
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accounts of middle-class women who did everyday things to
influence culture or resist the patriarchal systems that
dominate them (such as the suffragist movement, of which she was
a part). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what time women
would have had to engage in any material or non-material
pursuits at all, because, according to historical records, women
“had no tradition behind them, or one so short and partial that
it was of little help” (Woolf 2005 75). And even if women had
historical documents written by men at their disposal and
discretion, Woolf argues, and I agree, that these accounts would
have been incorrect, misleading, and wrong on many levels,
especially including the aesthetic. Historical accounts
typically universalize patriarchal aesthetics, so, even if they
had included accounts of everyday women and their influence on
culture, society, and commerce, they would have been
fundamentally inaccurate because, as Woolf states, “we think
back through our mothers if we are women” (75). The aesthetic
practice of “thinking back through our mothers” continues to
influence the writing that TPECs produce and the approach they
take to observing the culture in which they live.
Woolf’s views on aesthetics shed light on how women can
move on from the restrictive and prevailing attitudes and
cultural devaluation of women and women’s writing. For Woolf,
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and ultimately for me, it came down to the fact that, “these
monsters” (Woolf 2005 44), the women who are depicted in
histories, “however amusing to the imagination, have no
existence in fact. What one must do to bring her to life is to
think poetically and prosaically at one and the same moment,
thus keeping in touch with fact” (Woolf 2005 44). What this
means in the contemporary context of the TPEC is that TPECS
transform patriarchal aesthetics into collaborative aesthetics
that are not based on a necessarily solitary culmination, but a
distributed, non-linear, shared set of experiences that are
personal and specific.
There are scholars, especially in contemporary theoretical
circles, who observe that similar characteristics are important
to authentic historical and experiential accounts of every day
culture and life. For example, Ulmer’s concept of “mystory” is
one such way of approaching writing that, in an aesthetic sense,
resonates with what Woolf was calling for. In other words, the
author must not try to extract herself in restraint or false
objectivity from the writing that she produces; she is alwaysalready present within it and her very existence, in historical
terms at least, is at stake. Similar observations are made by
Donna Haraway (1991), for example, when she writes about women’s
absence from the performance and accounting of scientific
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studies. Haraway (1991) advocated for a standpoint theory of
scientific inquiry in which the former objective, removed
scientific observer would be replaced by a scientist who
acknowledged her own participation and influence on the study
and accounted for those influences in the reporting of her work.
In similar ways, TPECs have enacted new forms of writing that
employ the scientific, the aesthetic, and the cultural. My
observations and analyses of feminist technological textuality
add to this body of work.
Woolf observed long before the invention of transitory
textual technologies such as Web sites, Facebook, and blogs,
that “at any rate, . . . it is notoriously difficult to fix
labels of merit in such a way that they do not come off” (104).
In other words, the scene on the screen of technological
textuality is constantly changing at nearly the same rate at
which the technologies themselves evolve. It is too early in the
process of enacting textual technological activist gestures to
determine their enduring or lasting value to western culture.
But, I imagine myself peeling away some of the “labels of merit”
that have been perpetuated through U.S. patriarchal culture by
analyzing and performing the transgressive aesthetic writing
that is a form of progressive technological textuality.
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Participation, Pitch, Politics, and Power

Interestingly, though Woolf was incensed by many cultural
norms that negatively affected women, she preferred a quiet
feminism that was not about protesting vociferously or making
demands in public--feminism that in more recent decades has been
referred to as armchair feminism or everyday feminism. For
example, Lee (1998) wrote of Woolf, “Woolf’s writing was always
explicitly on the radical, subversive and modern side” (274) . .
. but “screams of rage and pain are not what she wants to hear
from other women, or what she allows herself” (17). However,
Woolf was involved in, even if not always radically outspoken
about, some impactful movements of her era, such as the cause
for women’s suffrage, political satire and critique (the
Dreadnought Hoax is her most famous), and her public commentary
about post-expressionism. Moreover, “her own skeptical
resistance to authority, and her horror of being dominated . . .
meant that she was always against a coercive government” (Lee
524). In fact, Lee (1998) identifies some of Woolf’s activities
as having legitimate “historical weight” (275) and notes that,
“in 1910, [Woolf] was involved with three events which came to
be read as connected expressions of British subversiveness: the
suffrage movement, the Dreadnought Hoax, and the Post133

Impressionist exhibition” (275). Though “she would not join up .
. . she was also a political participant” and “this position was
fundamental to her feminism” (Lee 524). In all of these
instances, Woolf clearly exhibited aspects of her alternative
selves and found satisfaction, pleasure, and validity in doing
so.
In a similar way, 21st century Internet culture provides
evidence that women from all varieties of circumstances,
educational levels, and relationship and employment statuses
continue to pursue their interests and identities through
activities that may prove to be historically and politically
important, even if they remain relatively quietly carried out.
For instance, in 2008, many women became more deeply involved in
voting because for the first time in history, a viable woman
presidential candidate was on the ticket (Hillary Clinton), as
well as a promising minority feminist man (Barack Obama). In
these candidates, women in record numbers became engaged with
the progression of the political election process and expressed
themselves through the right to vote. Moreover, much of that
campaign was conducted in cyberspace, and Hillary Clinton, a
woman presidential candidate who held that status well after a
number of more traditional white male candidates had conceded,
was a pioneer in conducting Web-based meetings, providing online
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information, and engaging in fundraising opportunities through
her campaign Web site. Barack Obama, the eventual winner of that
presidential election, also engaged his constituents through
progressive rhetoric and historic levels of participation
through political technological textuality. Media in general
were intimately and intricately involved in every aspect of this
long, unprecedented presidential race, securing a marker in
historical terms of a sea change in expectations for political
candidates and their campaigns with regard to their use of a
variety of media, including Internet technology. I conclude that
because of this monumental increase in the use of Web sites,
Facebook accounts, and blogs to inform the general public about
political campaigns and their candidates, the feminist adage
that “the personal is political” has entered a new age and has
earned a fresh meaning that resonates with the middle class
women that Woolf saw so much promise in and who are becoming
today’s TPECs.
In her recurring satirical spot entitled “Target Women” on
Current TV and current.com, TPEC Sarah Haskins has used
television and Web site media to sardonically criticize
stereotypical media portrayals of women. She, too, commented on
the media spectacle that was the 2008 presidential campaign in
her installment entitled “Obama Arms” (see Figure 10-13).
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Figure 10: Current.com's Sarah Haskins' segment "Obama Arms"

In this segment, Haskins exposes with the cultural
phenomenon of objectifying women, criticizing women of power and
intellect, and assuming that there is nothing of substance to
talk about with regard to women because, in the end, all they
care about is beauty, popularity, and fashion. Following is the
transcript of this segment:
Sarah Haskins: Michelle Obama has been in office just over
100 days. And she is already caught up in a constitutional
controversy. The culprit, that pesky second amendment, the
right to bear arms. (kisses each of her biceps)
That’s right. Welcome to the pun show.
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(These are some clips of the many TV news stories about
Obama’s “right to bare arms.”)
First lady Michelle Obama has ignited a controversy over
her right to bear arms. And we’re not talking about weapons
here, but her actual arms!
An unlikely proponent of your right to bear arms: A
Democrat! Michelle Obama is not working out with the NRA,
but she has been flaunting her guns of late.
The first lady’s sense of style and of course her toned
arms have been generating a lot of fashion buzz lately, and
of course speculation as to whether bare arms are
appropriate for all occasions.
Sarah Haskins: America is a nation with a puritan
So a first lady without sleeves is a shock to our
We need to express our concerns about her blatant
nudity. Luckily, the first amendment protects our
sound super dumb in man on the street interviews.

legacy.
system.
arm
right to

First interviewee (female): You look better when you’re
fully clothed.
Second interviewee (male): I love it. If he screws up, I’m
in there. She’s a nice tall girl.
Third interviewee (who is wearing a tank top): I think she
should look a little more presentable.
Interviewer: So you think that the sleeveless is a little
too much that you’ve seen her in? [sic]
Third interviewee: Yea.
Sarah Haskins: Point taken . . . lady not wearing sleeves!
But behind the controversy lies another question: Why would
she do this?
Another excerpt from a TV newscast:
Well, some believe that the first lady is willing to bare
her arms because she’s unwilling to show much of her legs
or her chest.
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Sarah Haskins: Yeah, show your tits Michelle Obama!
wwooooohhh!

Figure 11: Screen shot of Michelle Obama in Haskins' "Obama
Arms" segment
And just when armsgate ‘09 seemed to be at its boiling
point, a USA today survey conclusively proved that we
really don’t give a shit.
We don’t want her to not bare her arms, we just want her to
bare her arms because ooohhh they’re just so pretty!
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Figure 12: Screen shot of Sarah Haskins' "Obama Arms" segment
A clip of Kirstie Ally on the Oprah Winfrey Show:
I’m like look Michelle Obama’s guns, I’m like, I could have
those arms!
More news stories about how to get Michelle Obama arms:
Newscaster to a show guest (feeling her arms): Oh my god,
she’s like Michelle Obama arms!
You too could have the same amazing arms as the first lady.
Women all over are asking their fitness trainers, how do I
get arms like hers?
You want Michelle Obama arms? That’s easy, just hop right
down on your big ball.
Sarah Haskins: I know what you’re thinking. Are we going to
start doing everything Michelle Obama does? The answer is:
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Probably yes. Sooner or later, the whole country is going
to go to Princeton, then Harvard, then be Barack Obama’s
boss, then be an executive at the University of Chicago
hospitals, and then support local sustainable food
initiatives with a garden, and then . . . have sweet
fucking arms!

Figure 13: Screen shot of Haskins' "Obama Arms" segment
You can pry my guns out of my cold dead hands, but that’s
going to be hard, because my hands (holding out hands). . .
are attached to my guns (holding arms in bodybuilder pose).

Haskins shares her opinion of the media’s portrayal of
accomplished, smart women through comedy. Using the digital
media of TV and the Web, Haskins situates herself in a digital
room of her own in which she can write and perform in feminist
activist ways but continue to be included in more mainstream
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media. And it has worked. She has garnered a good reputation, a
solid number of fans, and her work as a TPEC has launched her
career to new levels. Moreover, she has succeeded in bringing
light to the politics of the TPEC, and she has exposed the
sexism inherent in U.S. culture through her creative use of
words and images. Her TPEC activism is becoming a mainstream
cultural pathway to an aesthetic that challenges patriarchal
assumptions about women, intelligence, and beauty.
If she had seen it and used it, Woolf might have agreed
that the Internet is a valuable tool for enacting one’s politics
as well as a venue for participating via a more subtle entry
point, yet she also might have found it, as many contemporary
women do, a powerful method of self-expression. But more than
that, as Lee (1998) stated about Woolf, “her late writing links
the old battle for the vote to women’s struggle for empowerment
in all areas: to earn their living, to escape the sexual double
standard and to gain equal opportunities in education” (277).
Woolf’s writing was her expressive outlet for deeply troubling
concerns for women, who, in her culture and indeed in her own
personal familial experience, having been denied a formal
education by her own father, were considered “the intellectual
inferiors of men” (Lee 282). Unfortunately, she began to
consciously assert this willingness to reject custom only near
141

the end of her life. In her 1941 diary, she wrote, “the idea
came to me that why I dislike, and like, so many things
idiosyncratically now, is because of my growing detachment from
the hierarchy, the patriarchy . . . I am I: and must follow that
furrow, not copy another” (Woolf 1954 346). Who knows what
masterpieces might have come from her pen in her elder years of
self-realization had she not committed suicide at 59. One can
only speculate.

The Aesthetic Situation of the TPEC

I argue that the TPEC resides among the theories of
aesthetics described earlier in this chapter. I admire women’s
use of Internet technologies to increase their personal and
collective agency and to enact everyday forms of feminist
technological textuality. The TPEC is a cyberfeminist in that
one of its basic principles is to challenge male-centered
culture (especially of the Internet) and imprint women’s models
of open and accessible computer-mediated communication on new
technologies (Luckman 36). The implementation does not
necessarily take the form of participation in role-playing games
(though many cyberfeminists emerged because of gaming
communities and the games’ gender-encoded expectations), and the
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implementation is not a technological-determinist venture,
though some cyberfeminists think that Internet technology can
save the world. The TPEC operates from the perspective of a
feminist who uses computer technologies as a central part of its
“everyday, lived feminist politics” (Luckman 37). And although
cyberfeminism has been associated primarily with young women in
their teens and twenties, older TPECs such as Sarah Haskins and
mom-101, who are in their 30s, as well as Katherine Hayles, who
is considerably older than these two generations, and others,
also use technologies in similar ways and lead our culture in
determining more useful, efficient, and creative ways to use the
Internet to organize, maintain, and manage extremely busy lives,
multiple roles, and shifting identities as well as to engage in
right/writ/ing some of the wrongs that are committed against
women as a gender group. Donna Haraway (1991) inspired and, in
my view, founded TPEC feminism, and her cyborgs resonate with
the TPEC as cyberfeminists because through them, she advocates
new ways of operating, relating to others, and managing women’s
lives in a world of “partial subjectivities” (147, 196).
Luckman argued that “women excel within fluid systems and
processes” and that they have already become adept at
recognizing these familiar patterns in digital technologies,
such as N. Katherine Hayles’ (1999) feminist examination of one
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of the first electronic fiction books, Patchwork Girl. The TPEC
agrees with womanist, African American, and postmodern feminists
that there is probably no way for any computer technology to
include all women, all the time, but it recognizes that women
will probably be the first to exploit the metaphor of the
Internet as a “multiple, distributed system” (Luckman 41) to
their advantage. In doing so, however, the TPEC cautions women
that any electronic freedom and any emergent digital body,
because of their locations in a “gendered, raced, classed, and
geographically” (Luckman 42) conditioned patriarchal world, will
exclude many and include only few unless and until women succeed
in participating in and influencing the expectations of culture
at large.
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CHAPTER 5: ALWAYS-ALREADY SCREENED: MISOGYNY AND THE ECONOMICS
OF ENOUGH
There was an enormous body
of masculine opinion to the effect
that nothing could be expected
of women intellectually
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005)

One example of women of relative privilege in the U.S. who
are helping women maquiladora workers on the Mexican-U.S. border
empower themselves to improve their lives through creative uses
of technology is La Casa de la Mujer--Grupo Factor X. Some women
from Grupo Factor X participated in the making of a documentary
film entitled Maquilapolis, (see Figure 14) which is about the
young Mexican women who work in maquiladoras. Maquiladoras are
U.S.-owned factories that moved across the border because of
relaxed trade agreements like NAFTA. These women are taking
action to improve their work environments by affiliating with
U.S.-based feminist groups that provide them with video cameras,
union information, and other resources. And, through computer
technologies that help them communicate and make connections
with other oppressed workers and their allies, coalitions of
feminist groups and sweatshop workers across the globe are
coming together to increase their power and influence. Though
their success is most often very slow in coming, the constant
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flow of texts, resources, technologies, people, and information
is key to these women’s empowerment. Particularly poignant,
moving, and equally important are the non-traditional methods
these women have used to document their environments and appeal
for help on a much larger scale using digital film technology
that resonates with larger, ostensibly more powerful and
influential, groups of people who spread their message and
thereby give them leverage in asserting their rights (see Figure
14).

Figure 14: Film still from Maquilapolis (2007), featuring some
of the maquiladoras from Grupo Factor X and the products they
manufacture
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Another example of Grupo Factor X’s use of Internet
technology to continue the awareness campaign and to garner
financial, political, and activist support of its efforts
includes the group’s making and maintaining contacts with other
organizations throughout the world using digital technologies to
initiate publicity campaigns within companies and government
institutions, which allows the maquiladoras and their allies to
stay informed and to further generate a self-sufficient and
active organization (Grupo Factor X 2010).
The work of the women maquiladoras in Grupo Factor X and
the others who participated in the making of Maquilapolis, as
well as other similar organizations in Baja, California and
elsewhere, further Woolf’s argument about the importance of the
middle class woman who writes. In most respects, the maquiladora
workers cannot be considered even lower middle class—they are
poor and have few and unreliable life-sustaining resources such
as food, water, shelter, and sanitation. Yet, through textual
technologies such as documentary film-making and Internet
coalition building via the help of others, they are able to
mobilize for their own interests and manifest in a literal and
figurative sense, rooms of their own (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15: A room in Delfina's house, under construction. Photo
by Luz Aida Ruiz Martinez, Grupo Factor X

Woolf and Misogyny

A great deal of Woolf’s thoughts in A Room of One’s Own
(2005) are about the misogyny and the rule of the father that
are ingrained in western patriarchal society. She questions many
things about the culture in which she lives, a culture that
objectifies and devalues women, and she critically examines how
this culture affects women and their ability to realize their
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full potential as human beings. In the introduction to A Room of
One’s Own (2005), Susan Gubar observes that Woolf probes “not
only the causes but also the consequences of misogyny” (Gubar
2005 liii), but also how “self-confidence [is] undermined . . .
by interdictions against female intellectual ambition” (Gubar
2005 liii). Indeed, Woolf was well-read in psychology, and
Freud, whom many feminists in the 21st century clearly identify
as a misogynist, was gaining popularity during her time. His
works influenced Woolf’s writing and her reactions to
explanations and declarations that were made about women, their
psychological faculties, and their behavior. In fact, Gubar
observes that “the psychology of creativity forms the central
core of her genealogical thinking about the differences between
male and female artistry. Under what circumstances, she wants to
know, does incandescent creativity become deformed by selfdestructive humility or bitterness” (Gubar 2005 liii)—
characteristics that Woolf found to be ever present in women so
that they generally doubted their very ability to qualify as
creative beings in any sense of the word. In fact, Woolf
observed about the psychological literature about women that
“there was an enormous body of masculine opinion to the effect
that nothing could be expected of women intellectually” (Woolf
2005 53) and she bristled against this prevailing societal
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construct because, as a matter of fact, she was quite
intelligent herself, self-taught and schooled by her brother,
well-read, and even respected among some contemporary male
intellectuals. She knew the prognostications of the various
experts were untrue about her and about many other women who,
given an opportunity and “enough,” could participate in and add
value to their environments. In one of her deepest and most
heart-felt observations, Woolf prophetically stated about the
women’s conundrum, “I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked
out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be locked in”
(Woolf 2005 24). She movingly writes about how so many women,
even to this day, feel about living within patriarchy, even
those who don’t know intellectually against what they are
struggling: fighting to gain foothold within the constructs of a
society that doesn’t allow women to fully engage and
participate, even when success is realized, is often bittersweet and dissatisfying to women because, once “in,” they face
alienation, envy, and jealousy from those who remain without as
well as emptiness of meaning within themselves because the
“inside” remains aesthetically barren, intellectually
unrewarding, and materially insufficient. The balance that
ideally could exist between the man-womanly and the woman-manly
remains skewed in favor of the manly.
150

Woolf maintains that observers from outside of her own
culture and experience could ultimately “not fail to be aware,
even from this scattered testimony, that England is under the
rule of patriarchy. Nobody in their senses could fail to detect
the dominance of the professor” (Woolf 2005 33).
Woolf further explains her understanding of patriarchy and
misogyny by acknowledging that, throughout history and
literature, as stated earlier, women have been practically nonexistent except in the sense that they are objectified or
portrayed as mystical, puzzling, but spiritually powerful
creatures. She observes that because of this,
a very queer, composite being thus emerges. Imaginatively
she is of the highest importance; practically she is
completely insignificant. She pervades poetry from cover to
cover; she is all but absent from history. She dominates
the lives of kings and conquerors in fiction; in fact she
was the slave of any boy whose parents forced a ring upon
her finger. Some of the most inspired words, some of the
most profound thoughts in literature fall from her lips; in
real life she could hardly read, could scarcely spell, and
was the property of her husband (Woolf 2005 43).
Further, Woolf observes, “she never writes her own life and
scarcely keeps a diary” (Woolf 2005 44) because she has to bear
the burden of the practical.
In fact, Woolf’s own diary reveals very personal and
intimate thoughts that relate to the ideas that she voiced
publicly in A Room of One’s Own (2005). Her own fears and self151

loathing are evident in her private thoughts when she writes
about her anticipation of the impending publication of A Room of
One’s Own (2005), “It is a little ominous that Morgan (E.M.
Forster) won’t review it. It makes me suspect that there is a
shrill feminine tone in it which my intimate friends will
dislike . . . also I shall be attacked for a feminist and hinted
at for a Sapphist . . . I am afraid it will not be taken
seriously” (Woolf 1954 145). Many of her intimate friends were
the famous men of Bloomsbury, accomplished thinkers and authors
themselves. She naturally wants their approval, but her elation
followed by insecurities upon finishing a book, essay, or other
piece of writing, occur throughout her life. Indeed, she laments
that the periods between writings, when she is not at work, are
when she suffers most from her bouts with depression and mental
illness (Woolf 1954 1954).
For Woolf, the work of writing was her salvation and her
refuge. Without it, she was literally driven mad. This tug-ofwar between her desire to write and be respected among
significant authors and the culture of her time, which dictated
the inadequacies of women in any form of paid work, but
especially intellectual work, contributed significantly to her
ultimate suicide. It is clear from reading her A Writer’s Diary
that she felt this manic sway over and over again as she wrote
152

her various works of fiction, review, and essay. In her diary on
Thursday, December 31st, 1936, she writes, “I could make some
interesting and perhaps valuable notes on the absolute necessity
for me of my work. Always to be after something” (Woolf 1954
264). Later, she writes, “I stop working [and] I feel that I am
sinking down, down. And as usual I feel that if I sink further I
shall reach the truth . . . I shall make myself face the fact
that there is nothing—nothing for any of us. Work, reading,
writing are all disguises” (Woolf 1954 141). And in the year of
her death, 1941, she writes, “A battle against depression,
rejection . . . this trough of despair, shall not, I swear,
engulf me. The solitude is great . . . The house is damp . . .
But there is no alternative . . . ‘Your true life, like mine, is
in ideas’ Desmond (McCarthy) said to me once” (Woolf 1954 350).
The cultural misogyny Woolf experienced with regard to her
writing was nearly always couched in praise of her work and
qualified by many of her male reviewers as good work “for a
woman.” While some of her insecurity may have been due to
untreated mental illness, some of her reasons for anxiety about
reviews and rejection of her work were very real. Woolf
struggled and ultimately failed to balance her need to work,
think, and write with the cultural expectation to be pleasant,
well-thought-of, and at least mildly pleasing to men.
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Moreover, Woolf observed that it wasn’t just that women
were ignored and marginalized throughout history, but they were
additionally “snubbed, slapped, lectured and exhorted. Her mind
must have been strained and her vitality lowered by the need of
opposing this, of disproving that” (Woolf 2005 54). In other
words, not only did she have to live within the constraints of
the very narrow allowances provided to women in patriarchal
culture, she also often endured literal abuse and suspicion.
Additionally, Woolf observed that “almost without exception
[women] are shown in their relation to men . . . all the great
women of fiction were, until Jane Austen’s day, not only seen by
the other sex, but seen only in relation to the other sex”
(Woolf 2005 81).
Because she witnessed the situation of women in her own
culture and as a result of the history that she studied well,
Woolf remarked that “nothing is known about women before the
eighteenth century” (Woolf 2005 45), and it was this notion that
informed her feminism and spurred her to encourage women to
write about themselves, for themselves, and for their mothers
and daughters so that history, including the history of women,
would not remain unwritten and unacknowledged. In my view, Web
pages, Facebook updates, and blogs are this century’s
metaphorical waste heap that future generations of
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anthropologists and social scientists will dig into to mine the
nuggets that began a TPEC culture that is more inclusive of
women even though they may also unearth some trainwrecks and
reified misogynistic fossils. They will see that women are
contributing to dispelling myths, exposing the effects of
patriarchy on the status of women, and using technology to
engage in everyday textuality that, intentional or not, promotes
the independence, autonomy, safety, and respect of women in U.S.
culture.
Woolf’s screening of culture through critiquing
misogynistic practices can be used to evaluate the following
post from the Web site Jezebel.com. In this September 17, 2010,
posting, contributor Dodai Stewart provided the following post,
based on an inquiry from a Jezebel.com reader (See Figure 1619). The reader describes her encounter with another user who
approached her on the social networking site OKCupid. OKCupid is
a free social networking Web site that allows users to instant
message each other, phone each other privately via their
personal phones whose numbers have been masked by the site, and
otherwise interact. This post demonstrates the condundrum that
social networking sites place women in. In some senses the
practice is liberatory in that any woman with access to an
Internet-ready computer can create an account and interact with
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like-minded people who share her interests and background or who
might be interested in dating or friendship. But she may not
have known that the site is well-known for its reputation as a
casual sex hook-up “location,” which obviously put the woman in
this exchange in an awkward, difficult, and insulting position
that she could not initially control.
In the comments to the post shown in Figure 18 and 19,
visitors to Jezebel.com share their thoughts and reactions to
such blatant misogyny and racism on the part of the man who
initiated the online conversation. It is clear from the comments
to this post that many Jezebel.com readers are feminists who
call sexism, misogyny, and racism what it is. The commentators
give voice to other women to whom similar interactions have
happened but who may not have had a community of supporters to
defend them after such an abrasive encounter. In these ways,
Jezebel.com screens U.S. culture through the lens of misogyny
and moves the discussion of misogynistic men from margin to
center, using new technology-enhanced methods that were not
available to Woolf. Jezebel.com enlightens contemporary culture
by encouraging its readers to learn about misogyny and racism in
contemporary culture and speak out against hatred of and
violence against women.
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Figure 16: Jezebel.com OKCupid post title
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Figure 17: Jezebel.com OKCupid post background information
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Figure 18: Jezebel.com OKCupid interaction transcript Part 1
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Figure 19: Jezebel.com OKCupid interaction transcript Part 2 and
analysis by Dodai Stewart

Stewart, the poster, points out the obvious racist aspects
of this post in her commentary. But if we were to additionally
lay Woolf’s misogyny screen over this exchange, the following
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points could also be made in addition to the comments that
Jezebel.com readers provided.
•

•
•

The offender is apparently a white man. Would he speak this
way to a white woman on OKCupid or does he reserve his
misogyny for women he perceives as “black?”
Let’s say he was trying to be humorous. Humor is no longer
funny when it degrades a woman.
In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf noted that men in patriarchy
treat women “not so much that she shall be inferior as that
he shall be superior, which plants him wherever one looks .
. . even when the risk to himself seems infinitesimal and
the suppliant humble and devoted” (54). In other words,
there was no provocation of this interaction by the woman,
other than her having a registered account on OKCupid. This
man assumed power over her by immediately writing
derogatory words without any sense of whether she might be
offended. His default assumption was that her thoughts and
feelings didn’t matter at all or certainly mattered less
than his.
The Fluidity of Sexuality

After she had married, Woolf expressed dissatisfaction with
the confining aspects of marriage on women, while at the same
time, she acknowledged the societal necessity of being married
for her ability to write and be published. Figure 20 shows a
photo of a feminist button that was posted on the Facebook page
Feminism is Important to the 21st Century that Woolf might have
found humorous considering her views on marriage. In her younger
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years, Woolf wrote about the possibilities in remaining single
or being married when she stated,
O how blessed it would be never to marry, or grow old; but
to spend one’s life innocently and indifferently among the
trees and rivers which alone can keep one cool and
childlike in the mist of the troubles of the world!
Marriage or any other great joy would confuse the clear
vision which is still mine. And at the thought of losing
that, I cried in my heart, ‘no, I will never leave you—for
a husband or a lover’ (Lee 230).

Figure 20: Don't marry be happy button from Feminism is
Important to the 21st Century Facebook page

Later, Lee (1998) wrote of Woolf’s husband Leonard, with
whom Woolf ran Hogarth Press, “He may have constrained her, but
he also provided conditions favourable for writing” and “It is
clear how much he admired her strenuous work habits and how much
she would have felt that admiration” (332). Similarly, in many
cases today, women who, like Woolf, conform to cultural norms
162

such as heterosexual marriages, express themselves through
online fora such as blogs, interest groups, self-publishing,
Internet-based businesses, and even in relatively simple Web
surfing and purchasing. In many instances, these activities are
well within the range of acceptable behavior for women who
otherwise hold traditional roles but who, by their involvement
with and participation in an emerging culture, may become
leaders in and shapers of the larger culture in which they live.
Alexander (2005) noted the historical importance of women
winning the right to vote on Woolf’s and other women’s
participation in writing.

She stated, “one of the effects of

post-suffrage feminism was that working class women’s experience
began to be not only observed and imagined but listened to,
written down—often by themselves—and published. This was the
first generation to be fully literate. The feminine demotic
shaped twentieth-century knowledge and aspiration in concrete
ways” (274). Moreover, the more contemporary examples of gentle
but symbolic and important entrances into the culture of a less
gender-specific cyberspace are rife with examples of the
everyday feminism and textuality that Woolf found appealing.
Additionally, Woolf’s piercing yet subtle ways of putting
forward her ideas were an essential component of who she was. In
my view, she would have appreciated digital technology for its
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ability to assist women in empowering themselves toward their
own goals and in search of their own spaces, because, for Woolf,
the “roles of wives and daughters in history was uppermost in
her mind” (Lee 631).
But, Woolf also recognized the complexities of remaining
subtle by acknowledging that doing so in some ways equated to
being silenced, ignored, and considered inconsequential. Woolf
wrote in her notes that this duality was an “opposition” that
“would sink deep into her mind” (Lee 324) because, though there
was “nothing ignoble in being a consumer . . . man wage-earner
can make his power felt, woman consumer very little power. Wage
earner’s view predominates” (324). Unfortunately, this is still
the case in some respects today. But increasingly, research
shows that although marketing efforts are relatively slow to
recognize the power of the woman as consumer and breadwinner,
she is nonetheless growing more and more powerful because of her
behavior in the world of money, household budgets, and larger
financial systems, planning, and transactions (GrossbardShechtman 2003). Much of this women-based research is possible
because of the data-gathering and measurement capabilities of
Internet technology.
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The Economics of Enough

Present throughout Woolf’s writing is her commentary about
economic issues, especially with regard to the agency that
enough money can afford a woman. This concept pervades her
writing. Many readers of this dissertation are already familiar
with Woolf’s groundbreaking and pervasive concept of a room of
one’s own. These words were stated, re-phrased, and reemphasized many times in her book, A Room of One’s Own (2005),
almost as if she knew that the ideal would emerge as an iconic
phrase and a feminist anthem over time. For example, her
statement that “it is necessary to have five hundred a year and
a room with a lock on the door if you are to write fiction or
poetry” (Woolf 2005 103) illustrates the necessity to writing of
time, space, and control of one’s environment on a number of
levels. Her admonition to “earn five hundred a year by your
wits” (Woolf 2005 65), and “earn money and have a room of your
own” (Woolf 2005 109) promotes the independence and autonomy of
mind, spirit, and body that is necessary for a woman to not have
to rely on men for her basic needs of shelter, food, and
clothing. Further, these accommodations can afford a woman much
more than time, space, and financial resources to write. They
also provide her with the opportunity to “live in the presence
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of reality, an invigorating life” (Woolf 2005 109). The concept
of living in the presence of reality and living an invigorating
life are important to my arguments about how women in this
century embrace technologies to their benefit and work with them
to realize the ideal of presently living an invigorating life in
their own digitally-influenced realities.
Some scholars and lay people have tried to monetarily
equate Woolf’s 500 pounds to a current monetary value. But the
exact figure is not the point; the essence of her admonition is
freedom, and freedom, to her, meant space, place, time, and
provisions. Today, the requirements of a room of one’s own may
be different, but the essential need for women who would write
put forth by Woolf remains the same, regardless of class.
The blogger mom-101 provides an example of how women in
present-day western culture are using digital technologies to
assert their right to write in a space and place of their own.
Although she is in a traditional male-female marriage with two
young children, she writes about the benefits to her and her
family of asserting her individuality and her right to write. In
her post dated June 18, 2010, she writes,
When I see Sage seated in her little rocking chair, a small
black board—an IKEA media shelf in another life—on her lap
and she tells me she’s “on the computer,” my heart sinks a
little.
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I’m on the computer too much.
She can’t get my attention and so she’s emulating me.
She sees me working from home sometimes in our small
apartment and reads it as “mommy’s not playing with us.”
Even if Nate is home. Even if their sitter is with them.
So I close my own black laptop and play her game. “What are
you doing with your computer sweetie? Playing a game?”
“NO!”
She shouts NO! More than she ever simply says it. You
know…threes).
“I’m writing a book, mommy.”
“You’re writing a book? What kind of book?”
“A book about me and Thal. And we’re playing and we jump
and there’s Peter Pan and at the end Bart Sim-Sim comes
out.”
“That sounds like a great book, Sage!”
“I’m writing a book like you.”
I thought, three year olds pretend to be firefighters and
tea party hosts and stuffed animal caretakers and fairies
and princesses and doctors and Woody the cowboy. If she’s
playing Be a Writer Like Mommy, that’s not such a bad thing
at all.
And yes I’m writing a book. With Kristin. The book we’ve
wanted to write for three years, but didn’t know what it
was, and now we do. Posting here may be lighter for a bit;
proposal is almost done and is making me more happy than
happy.
My kids see that in me too.
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In this U.S. culture, there is validation for women in
remaining committed to the work they love as well as the
families they love. In this case, the young daughter finds her
mother’s writing admirable even in the presence of the selfdoubt expressed by her mother. Culture changes from generation
to generation, and perhaps this young girl will grow up without
the guilt her mother feels for having spent hours writing,
editing, and contributing money to the household as well as
ideas to the world.
Some may claim that the ideal behind a room of one’s own
and five hundred pounds a year is superficial and unrealistic
for many women of the world who may not have access to the
comforts of western culture or the relatively high quality of
life that a modernized country and culture can provide. But
Woolf, like I try to do in my work, acknowledges that not all
women have the same level of resources available to them and
that it is indeed much more difficult for some women to believe
that a time might exist when they enjoy their own income and
their own environment free of external responsibilities, even if
for short periods of time during their lives. But Woolf insists
that, although these facts are true, and that “still you may say
that the mind should rise above such things; and that great
poets have often been poor men” (Woolf 2005 105), it also rings
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true that “making a fortune and bearing thirteen children—no
human being could stand it” (Woolf 2005 22), and that “in the
first place, to earn money was impossible for [women], and in
the second . . . the law denied [women] the right to possess
what money they earned” (Woolf 2005 22). In other words, there
are always forces that work against the transgressive and
liberatory work of women on behalf of women, and, even though
the work may be difficult, slow, and often fruitless, the work
is essential nonetheless, and the concept of a room of one’s own
evokes, even if only in the minds of women and not in their
realities, a sense of accomplishment and a sense of the value
for having done it for themselves without the rules,
restrictions, and oppressions of the culture at large, or, as
Woolf put it, “the claims and tyrannies of their families”
(Woolf 2005 52).
Woolf goes on to observe that “certainly our mothers had
not provided us with anything comparable to all this—our mothers
who found it difficult to scrape together thirty thousand
pounds, our mothers who bore thirteen children”(23). Indeed, it
would have been difficult for Virginia’s mother to imagine even
the level of autonomy that Virginia realized by good fortune, or
luck, in her own life. But women in the 21st century can
recognize the value and importance of the early observations of
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Woolf to their own lives. Many women work and earn their own
money; many women pursue education and gain independence of
thought and action; and many women own or have access to
“rooms,” whether material, digital, or imagined, of their own in
which to write or pursue whatever independent activities they
enjoy. Without these trappings that symbolize and actualize
independence for women, women in contemporary U.S. culture would
arguably be in comparable conditions to those in which Woolf
lived. In these ways, Woolf is arguing for the economics of
enough in that, although there are marked and highly pervasive
patriarchal systems working against women and the concept of a
room of one’s own, even in the virtual, real, or mental
conceptualization of this idea, there is liberation and
empowerment.
Because the notion of a room of one’s own can engender a
confidence and sense of self-agency for women, I argue that
women are able to assert claims to their “rooms” in material,
intellectual, and intangible ways. About the material benefits
of a woman’s own room, Woolf writes, “what change of temper a
fixed income will bring about. No force in the world can take
from me my five hundred pounds. Food, house and clothing are
mine for ever. Therefore not merely do effort and labour cease,
but also hatred and bitterness. I need not hate any man; he
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cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any man; he has nothing to
give me”(38).
Further, women can, through the concept of the economics of
enough and a room of one’s own, realize a form of intellectual
freedom that is not often available to those who may have the
capacity to produce literature, poetry, fiction, and other
texts, but who are restricted by poverty. She writes, “the poor
poet has not in these days, nor has had for two hundred years, a
dog’s chance . . . That is it. Intellectual freedom depends upon
material things. Poetry depends upon intellectual freedom. And
women have always been poor, not for two hundred years merely,
but from the beginning of time” (Woolf 2005 106).
Finally, Woolf advocates for women producing writing
regardless of the reward or materiality that it might produce.
Her insistence on this is based on her knowledge that
independent thought, intangible but undeniable words, when
written down, live on in perpetuity to influence the future. And
that, in and of itself, is of great importance to the
progression of women and the ideals of feminism. In defense of
this, Woolf states, “if we live another century or so . . . and
have five hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we
have the habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what
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we think . . . I maintain that [emphasis added] . . . even in
poverty and obscurity, is worth while” (Woolf 2005 112).
In summary, the economics of enough demonstrates how women
in U.S. culture today are using digital technologies to write
their own thoughts, to write exactly what they think, even if it
appears to be only for the sake of having written it and in
spite of whether it yields material gain or profound levels of
observation and acknowledgment by wide audiences. And even
though, for example, some women make money by blogging and
endorsing products, Woolf might agree that it is the act of
writing itself that is most liberating. Their words, en masse,
are the markers of progress, even if some of them cross over the
proverbial materialistic, self-centered line of commercial
influence.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SCREENING OF EPISTEMOLOGY
The human frame . . .
is, heart, body and brain
all mixed together,
and not contained
in separate compartments.
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005)

Epistemology as a Feminist Concept

Epistemology is important to my arguments. Rather than
simply observing patriarchy at the level of characteristics and
consequences, like Woolf did so many years ago, I understand
that changes in social constructs cannot be realized unless the
underlying cultural thought processes and learned ways of
knowing the world are examined and processed. In my work, I
analyze how technologies are being used by women in U.S. culture
to promote feminist ideals, and I equate that work, and the
women enacting it, with concepts that Woolf put forward in her
writing and technological textuality. So far, I have illuminated
the screens that Woolf used to evaluate and critique how women
and men understand the world and know what they know. I have
also discussed the manifestation of those screens through
similar activities of textual technology in the 21st century. But
the last screen, epistemology, is very important, and I use this
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chapter to explain how cognitive theory, feminist theory, and
theories of texts and technologies work together and can effect
change in the way knowledge is constructed, perceived, and
evaluated. While doing so, I also draw on Woolf’s astute
observations about epistemology to demonstrate the connections I
make between her work, the theoretical underpinnings, and the
examples of contemporary TPECs who use digital technologies to
advance the work and worth of women.
Many of Woolf’s ideas about epistemology were ahead of
their time. Only in very recent decades with the work of such
scientists as Eleanor Rosch and Antonio Varela, among others,
have some of the basic ideas that Woolf had about women’s
understanding of their lives, thought processes, and knowledge
been validated by more recent theories of subjective and
situational epistemology such as environmental, economic,
genetic, and other factors. For example, Woolf stated that “the
human frame

. . . is, heart, body and brain all mixed together,

and not contained in separate compartments”(Woolf 2005 18). In
other words, much like Varela and Rosch observed from the 1970s
on, the human brain is not a separate and discrete organ that
functions on its own in isolation from the other systems of the
internal body but its function is also affected by the
circumstances of a person’s experiences, culture, and external
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environments. The synapses that occur because of environmental
factors and experience influence the nervous and other body
systems that control human behavior. But more importantly, Woolf
suspected ahead of her time that these synapses that were
formerly believed to be fixed and inflexible are actually reprogrammable and remarkably resilient.
Woolf also asks probing questions about how we know what we
know. She states while combing through artifacts at the British
Museum, “where, I asked myself, picking up a notebook and a
pencil, is truth” (26)? This is the type of question that I ask
when I examine the 21st century technologies that are available
to women and which women use to promote feminist ideals through
textuality. Where does truth, or Truth (the collective set of
“knowns”), if you will, reside in the 21st Century? Museums still
exist, but libraries, for example, as Virginia Woolf knew them,
large, revered, austere repositories of Truth, no longer exist
solely in that (quite literally concrete) form. Many people
nowadays never set foot in a library, even when conducting
extensive academic research. Libraries have embraced new
technologies and have evolved into “cybraries” (my term).
Technology has changed where wisdom and truth reside, it has
allowed more people to contribute to the repository, and it has
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also changed the length, situation, and verifiability of truths
because of its relatively transitory and fluid nature.
The following segment of the Rachel Maddow cable TV show,
which was featured recently on Jezebel.com, provides a good
example of how Woolf’s screen of epistemology, or her continuous
examination of how we know what we know, is being used in
contemporary digital contexts. The Jezebel.com post is entitled
“And This is Why it Matters Who Goes on Cable News,” and in this
segment (see Figure 21-22), Rachel Maddow speaks with Princeton
professor Melissa Harris Lacewell, who very succinctly and
intelligently elaborates on the recent trend in women political
candidates to run on anti-abortion or pro-life platforms.
Portions of the transcript of this interview include:
Let’s be completely clear about the facts here. There is no
place in the world and no time in history where restricting
women’s reproductive rights makes a people or a nation more
free or more equal . . .
These extreme positions on abortion are without question a
war on girls and women . . .
It is incredibly important that we recognize that despite
the fact that we can be very proud of these women as women
and as politicians. The question is how do women as
citizens fare on the other side of them either being
elected or not elected . . .
It has more to do with our ignorance about our
understanding about women’s life experience. When you talk
about the rape and incest clause, I suspect that many
Americans, maybe even many pro-choice Americans, think that
rape and incest and pregnancy resulting from it is a pretty
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unusual occurrence. They suspect that there are maybe a
dozen or so women for whom that would make a difference in
any given year . . .
It’s still true that one
to be sexually assaulted
possibility of pregnancy
about thousands of women

in four women and girls is likely
in their lifetimes. The
is very real; . . . We’re talking
and thousands of pregnancies . . .

The point of government isn’t to make life so hard for half
of our citizens that the only force there to help them is
God. We as a government and as a people deserve and should
do better (Jezebel.com).

Figure 21: Screen shot of Harris-Lacewell interview
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Figure 22: Commentary on Jezebel.com's post "And This is Why It
Matters Who Goes on Cable News"

Engaging posts and political commentary such as the type
that is offered on Jezebel.com offer readers an opportunity to
learn more about issues that affect their everyday lives.
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Without posts like this, some women may not know the difference
between pro-choice, pro-life, or anti-abortion platforms. Using
the screen of feminist epistemology to filter misleading partydriven ads and confusion-inducing campaign speeches, Jezebel.com
(and in this case, Rachel Maddow, of course) illuminate what
otherwise may not be seen and elucidate arguments that may
otherwise be taken at face value. In other words, media outlets
such as Jezebel.com help us to understand and question how we
know what we know.

Defining Epistemology

In the ways I have introduced above, textual technologies
that are available to women have increased their ability to
determine for themselves how they know what they know or even
how to find out what to know. In many ways, they construct their
own screens (or frames) of reference via the technologies that
they use. I think that Woolf would have agreed with me in this
regard. For example, if technology had not intervened and women
had not taken it up to use for their own benefit, the situation
that Woolf describes in A Room of One’s Own (2005) might still
be women’s circumstance today. She states, “for it needs little
skill in psychology to be sure that a highly gifted girl who had
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tried to use her gift for poetry would have been so thwarted and
hindered by other people, so tortured and pulled asunder by her
own contrary instincts, that she must have lost her health and
sanity to a certainty” (Woolf 2005 49). Finally, she also opined
that, in her time, these new paradigms for understanding the
construction of knowledge were not possible when she wrote, “but
these are difficult questions which lie in the twilight of the
future” (Woolf 2005 76).
I insist that including research on the brain and mind is
critical to my work in feminist texts and technology because
there are valid, worthy, and revealing studies about cognition
that disrupt the things that western culture believes about the
real, the true, and the nature of the world. There is support
for my thesis within the field of cognitive science, and in
fact, the very definition of cognitive science that is offered
by Hubert Dreyfus in his essay “Cognitivism Abandoned,”
indicates that cognitive science is indeed a multidisciplinary
field that can and should draw from a multiplicity of resources
to determine how it is that we know what we know. Dreyfus (1995)
defined the term cognitive science in a very understandable and
approachable way, and his definition is the one that I maintain.
Dreyfus (1995) stated, “Cognitive science is any attempt to
explain how the mind and brain produce intelligent behavior. . .
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. it’s just the name for a natural confluence of all the
disciplines that study the mind-brain: philosophy, linguistics,
computer science, anthropology, neuroscience, psychology” (72).
And of course, I believe that Dreyfus (1995) might agree that
feminist theories and some theories of texts and technologies
have a place in that definition as well (73).

A Shift From Linear Epistemological Models

In their 1991 book The Embodied Mind, Francisco Varela,
Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch described their vision of a
unique but promising entry point for studying cognition. Namely,
they argued that the mindful meditative qualities of Buddhism
can successfully marry with some of the precepts of cognitive
science to produce a more accurate way of studying the brain and
mind. The word embodied resonated with my reading of the
feminist theoretical idea that language, ideas, identities, and
even scientific facts are socially and situationally constructed
notions perpetuated by a western patriarchal culture in which
women must negotiate their lives. Donna Haraway, in Simians,
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), describes
situated knowledges as those that “require that the object of
knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not a screen or a
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ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master that
closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of
‘objective’ knowledge” (198).
Rosch’s earlier work in categorization and computation
suggested that the brain’s propensity to categorize ideas,
objects, and perceptions is based largely on one’s life
experience and/or shared socialized agreements about the way
things are. Lakoff (1995) describes Rosch’s early work on
categorization in an easily understandable way, and he points
out that even in her earlier work, Rosch began to understand
that the brain does not work as a simple computational device,
but relies on its embodied nature to construct the way an
individual sees the world. Lakoff stated of Rosch’s stance, “the
psychologically basic categories are in the middle of the
category hierarchy, that they depend on things like perception
and motor movement and memory. . . . any objectivist account of
categorization could not work. . . . Rosch had shown that the
human body was involved in determining the nature of
categorization” (Lakoff 119). To paraphrase Lakoff, and to get
to the basis of Rosch’s point, how humans know the world is not
the result of objective, removed, scientific facts. In fact, it
may be that nothing of what we know is disembodied and
independent of the particularities of the human mind.
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Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) approach to studying
cognition was quite reminiscent of feminist standpoint theory,
and indeed, they wrote about their ideas at nearly exactly the
same time as Haraway. Haraway wrote Simians, Cyborgs, and Women:
The Reinvention of Nature in 1991, the same year in which The
Embodied Mind was first published. Though N. Katherine Hayles
didn’t write her groundbreaking and highly relevant work How We
Became Posthuman until 1999, she began writing on the subjects
of technology, scientific inquiry, and embodiment in her earlier
work of less acclaim, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in
Contemporary Literature and Science, in 1990. In these three
works, I found the beginnings of the great connections that
exist among the disciplines, and interestingly, that each area
of cognitive screening is affected by a variety of technologies.
Haraway, Hayles, and others have engaged in discourse with
cognitive theoretical ideas. In fact, Hayles wrote the book
review that is quoted on the back cover of The Embodied Mind.
These well-known theorists, along with Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch, (1991) as well as many feminist theorists who grapple
with science--especially the science of technology--have been
correct all along.
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The Feminist Science of Texts and Technology

Donna Haraway (1991) summed up the essence of feminist
science when she wrote, “Feminist objectivity is about limited
location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and
splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become
answerable for what we learn how to see” (190). And Haraway
(1991) further insisted that feminists should “demythologize
masculinist science” (79); and, she continued by acknowledging
Hubbard’s claim that feminists should be able to “‘think beyond
it, [we] must do the necessary work in the field, in the
laboratories, and in the libraries and come up with ways of
seeing the facts and of interpreting them’” (qtd. in Haraway
1991: 79). In the field of cognitive science, Rosch and her
colleagues began to construct their studies of the brain and
mind in this feminist way, and they confirmed that formerly
exclusive science- and technology-related fields can be studied
and theorized through a situated, embodied feminist
technological screen.
Ulric Neisser (1997), in his essay “The Future of Cognitive
Science: An Ecological Analysis,” describes Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch’s (1991) work on embodiment as the beginning of a
trend that takes a more realistic and holistic view of the brain
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and mind. He states of their work, “many contemporary models of
information processing are coming to the same conclusion. In a
trend that seems likely to continue, multiple systems and
parallel processing have replaced ‘central processing units’ as
the most popular theoretical architectures in cognitive science”
(250).
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) primary thesis in the
book is that they use tenets of French philosopher Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s early works such as The Structure of Behavior
and Phenomenology of Perception to inform their proposal that
the concept of the body as a physical and an experiential
structure is not oppositional but relational (xv).
Additionally, they argue that “science . . . incarnates its
understanding in technological artifacts . . . thinking/acting
machines, which have the potential to transform everyday life”
(xvii). Further, they assert that “the concept of a nonunified
or decentered . . . cognitive being is the cornerstone of the
entire Buddhist tradition” (xviii). Throughout the formulation
of their ideas, they introduce ideas such as the “reflective
scientist” (3), examine what they mean by “human experience”
(15), identify the “role of reflection in the analysis of
experience,” (27), explore the foundations of cognitivism and
computation (37-84), define mindfulness, selflessness, and
185

meditative scientific inquiry (85-207), and call for a mindful,
selfless, more global approach to scientific study of the brain
and mind (237-245). In my view, the approach that Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch (1991) take in The Embodied Mind may be a
bit more spiritual in its emphasis on Buddhism than is feminism
in general, but because it always-already locates the activities
of the brain and the mind in situated and embodied
circumstances, it remains a feminist-scientific approach.

Areas of Conjuncture Among the Disciplines

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind (1991)
connects to other cognitive theories as well as theories from
other disciplines. I researched the connections among embodied
cognition and other cognitive theories, feminist theory and
feminist epistemology, memetics, cognitive theories, and
theories of texts and technology. These theories support an
integrated and interdisciplinary approach to the study of the
epistemology that accounts for many of the concerns that critics
from the above-mentioned fields have addressed with regard to
traditional, western-formulated constructs that inhibit and
constrict knowledge acquisition and creation and that deny
alternative ways of knowing. They also support Woolf’s early and
186

progressive feminist ideas about knowledge, rights, personal
experience, and the intellectual capabilities of women. Donna
Haraway described her feminism in her book Simians, Cyborgs, and
Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), when she stated,
“Feminism loves another science: the sciences and politics of
interpretation, translation, stuttering, and the partly
understood. Feminism is about the sciences of the multiple
subject with (at least) double vision. Feminism is about a
critical vision consequent upon a critical positioning in
inhomogenous gendered social space” (195). By approaching the
study of the human brain in this multi-faceted way, feministtechnology theorists can embody the breakthroughs they want to
realize with regard to societal attitudes about women and their
identities, politics, and textuality.
In just one example of the variety of connections with
other cognitive theories, V.S. Ramachandran developed a
mechanism for treating phantom limb syndrome in patients who had
suffered arm and hand amputations. With his invention of the
mirror box, Ramachandran (1998) broke new ground in
demonstrating the brain’s uncanny ability to re-map itself and
allow amputees, and later, stroke victims, to begin addressing
their difficulties with movement and pain (See Figure 23).
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Figure 23: Visual representation of the mirror box (2010)

This is just one of the most famous ways in which
Ramachandran revolutionized the way scientists think about the
brain, vision, and the possibilities offered by conceptualizing
the brain as an embodied organ. Charles Wolfe (2005) agrees that
Ramachandran’s (1998) tenets are key to working through the
complexities inherent in conceptualizing the embodied mind. He
states, “Consider for instance the fact of volitional control of
a phantom limb, as described in Ramachandran’s (1998) famous
mirror box experiment (which he also describes as the ‘virtual
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reality box’) and its implications for an integrated vision of
the body, mind, and brain” (2). In other words, since
Ramachandran’s approaches are noted and lauded for their simple
processes that yield profound insights, his embracing of the
idea of an integrated mind-body is quite important for advancing
this theory.
In Wolfe’s own work, he has moved forward the concept of
the social brain, which links the body, the brain, and the
world. In this construct, Wolfe argues, the social brain “must
also be an embedded vision of the brain, not just in the body
but in the network of symbolic relations. One can describe this
as the 'social brain', and emphasize the coeval, co-originary
relation between organ and prosthesis, so that the difference
between an original substrate and an artifact disappears or
becomes purely instrumental” (Wolfe 2005). My interpretation of
Wolfe’s statement concludes that his social brain corresponds
with Ramachandran’s (1998) mirror box in that the brain allows
itself to re-learn its embodiment within a new or different
material, corporeal reality such as an arm prosthesis or a
paralyzed hand. Because researchers like Ramachandran have
shown, and theorists such as Wolfe have demonstrated, that the
brain is able to recreate a new sense of embodiment and overcome
seriously quality-of-life-restricting physical, mental, and
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emotional circumstances, they have opened new doors in the world
of science that may allow for even greater reimaginings in
related fields such as sociology, psychology, technology,
writing, and more, and those new imaginings could connect these
fields with science to come close to the more egalitarian cyborg
future that Donna Haraway and other feminists envision or the
man-womanly, woman-manly identity that Woolf idealized. In other
words, if the brain itself can adapt and thrive, certainly the
social contracts and constructs of men and women also can
change.
N. Katherine Hayles (2002) questions how the embodied mind
approach may impact the way we continue to study human
relationships in the future when she states, “Consider first the
force of habits that shape embodied responses—especially
proprioception, the internal sense that gives us the feeling
that we occupy our bodies rather than merely possess them”
(299). Hayles (2002) further elaborates on this concept by
referring to philosopher Clark’s (1997) assertion that
“cognition should not be seen as taking place in the brain
alone” (302) and that “the distinctive characteristic of humans
has always been to enroll objects into their cognitive systems,
creating a distributed functionality [Clark] calls extended
mind” (302). Moreover, Hayles (2002) agrees with Clark that the
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extended mind is not a new concept. Even David Hume recognized
that embodiment had something to do with perception and knowing.
Neisser, in his 1997 essay “The Future of Cognitive Science: An
Ecological Analysis,” cites Hume’s early suspicions about the
concept of the human self when he states that Hume intimately
studied his own concept of self and determined that in no way
could he perceive of his self without simultaneously perceiving
some other perception along with it. In other words, when Hume
thought of self, the thought always was accompanied by some
sense of light or darkness, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,
and those associated thoughts indicated some of the first
recorded revelations that perceptions, especially perceptions of
the brain, mind, and self, are embodied (250).
But Hayles (2002) took the notion of embodiment even
further when she stated, “the joining of technology with biology
has created a ‘cognitive machinery’ that is ‘now intrinsically
geared to transformation, technology-based expansions and a
snowballing and self-perpetuating process of computational and
representational growth’” (302). In the final chapter, I
explicitly bring together Woolf’s ideas about writing,
creativity, and space/place with feminist theories and theories
of texts and technology to illuminate the connections among them
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with regard to the 21st century technologized mind/body that I
have described above.
In the following section, I demonstrate how the examples I
have shown above can be combined with feminist epistemology and
feminist theory to renew the necessary examination of western
culture, politics, and the situation of women and what those
renewals mean for a technology-saturated future in which more
and more demands are placed on women to be all-accessible, allplugged-in, and all-able, all the time. Further, I suggest how
Woolf’s ideals of autonomy and isolation relate to these
expanded ideas about epistemology and women’s participation in
creative acts. Moreover, I draw conclusions about women’s
creativity using technology that support my claim that many of
these technological forms of writing are demonstrations of
creative feminist textuality.

Feminist Theory and Epistemology

So, if the brain can re-map, re-learn, and re-interpret its
embodied self as I have so far defended, I argue that humans can
also re-map, re-learn, and re-interpret their social contracts
and socialized institutions of power and privilege, which are
tenets of feminism. By understanding that the brain and the body
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have been shown scientifically to be intimately interdependent,
a feminist epistemology that values context and situation, that
posits facts as social constructions, and that favors the
particular over the universal, when it is paired with the
concept of the embodied mind, has the potential to be adopted by
western culture in general and enacted in technological
environments that can empower women. I say this because the
realm of science has typically been associated with maleness and
authority, and the body has remained in the realm of femaleness,
as Pressley (2008) describes when she states, “dualistic
thinking has led to the association of maleness with reason,
mind, objectivity, and universals while femaleness is associated
with emotion, body, subjectivity, and particulars” (5), a
cultural condition that Woolf wrote about often in derogatory
terms.

Similarly, Haraway asserted in Simians, Cyborgs, and

Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991) that, “An epistemology
that justifies not taking a stand on the nature of things is of
little use to women trying to build a shared politics. But
feminists also know that the power of naming a thing is the
power of objectifying, of totalizing” (79). So, since the (male)
realm of science, as demonstrated in the examples above from
Ramachandran, Wolfe, Hume, and others, knowingly or not,
perpetuates and substantiates longstanding feminist theorists’
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claims that the (male) mind and (female) body are codependent,
inseparable entities, it remains possible that socially
constructed, faulty patriarchal practices relating to authority,
power, and privilege can be re-negotiated and re-learned, and
more inclusive ones can be re-institutionalized, as Woolf may
have fantasized and as I have described using technology-based
examples.
Moreover, feminist epistemology can be paired with feminist
theories such as standpoint theory, which analyzes the systems
that validate oppressive systems; de-dichotomizes binarial
notions such as reason/emotion, mind/body, universal/particular,
good/bad, woman/man, and others; and investigates the
relationships between knowers and known objects, to expand
western culture’s acceptance of values, aesthetics, and ways of
knowing that are currently marginalized, denied, or ignored.
Pressley (2008) may agree with this assertion, because she
further states, “Feminism has also interplayed with . . . social
investigations of knowledge. . . . Feminist epistemologists do
not suggest that empirical evidence is wrong, but rather that it
is necessary to understand that most beliefs are as much a
result of their social context as they are factually true. . .
These philosophers are often working on undertakings that are
political in addition to intellectual” (48). This is the exact
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type of science that Woolf envisioned as a vindicator of the
many intuitional things she knew about the intellectual
capabilities of women that were not allowed voice during her own
time. In a similar way, Lorraine Code (1994) writes about her
term, epistemic responsibility, which refers to cognitive agency
and choice, as being

framed within a construction of intellectual virtue—
epistemic character—that owes a debt to virtue ethics.
It is premised on the assumption that the items that a
person knows quite unequivocally, as she knows that a
cup is on the table, comprise a small part of her—or
anyone’s—knowledge. The persistent exemplary status of
such items in foundational and coherentist theories of
knowledge obscures the extent to which there are
genuine choices about how to know the world and its
inhabitants, choices that become apparent only in more
complex epistemic circumstances—for example, in
knowing other cultures, negotiating an environmental
policy, assessing the significance of certain actions
and policies, or predicting the implications of tests
and experiments. Such circumstances and others like
them, occasion questions about epistemic
responsibility. In so doing they broaden the scope of
epistemology to include considerations of credibility
and trust, of epistemic obligations and the legitimate
scope of enquiry. These issues, in turn, make
knowledge production more a communal than an
individual endeavor (2).
In my own words, there is now a new direction for the old
feminist adage that ‘the personal is political;’ my new but
similar adage becomes “the technologized, embodied mind is
political.”
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Memetics

So far I have established connections between the
scientific embodied mind and the political embodied mind, and I
have implied that inherent in these terms is the notion that
they are relational concepts that result from continual changes
and shifts in the ways that brains and bodies interact with and
co-create the world in which they exist. Now I transition into
the concept that I refer to as the politically embodied cyborg
that holds promise and possibilities for a more inclusive,
tolerant, and less socially restricting future by introducing
the concept of memetics.
Dougherty (2001) describes memetics as a concept that
assumes that “belief is more manipulable and controllable than
the inadequately scientific social scientists of both the past
and the present had ever imagined” (87). Dougherty (2001)
reinscribes Dawkins’ work on memes that equates them to
sociological DNA, when he states, “These fast-evolving new
genes, or memes, include cultural products such as religious
beliefs, political convictions, pop culture fads, or virtually
anything else that can get passed on by imitation. These things
too are living replicators, since, as Dawkins concurs with N.K.
Humphrey, “[m]emes should be regarded as living structures”
197

(88). And Dougherty (2001) also recalls Susan Blackmore’s
description of memetics as “a new way of looking at the self”
(94) that she labels a selfplex for which “our brains provide
the ideal machinery” and “our society provides the selective
environment” (qtd. in Dougherty: 94) for it to construct and
thrive.
In these ways, I formulate my synthesis of mind, body, and
technology. For example, DNA has often been referred to as
genetic code, and code is a term intimately associated with
computer technology, so it could be said that DNA is a bodily
manifestation of a type of encoded, technological system.
Dougherty (2001) carries this idea further when he states that
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) offer “a helpful comparison
between computationalism and connectionism,” where “symbolic
regularities emerge from parallel distributed processes” (qtd.
in Dougherty: 88). In other words, the mind is not just a
computer, it is a much more sophisticated thinking, feeling,
adapting, re-mapping, environmentally-responsive machine that
requires definite material conditions for survival.
Additionally, Dougherty (2001) believes that “this computer
model possesses a simple elegance. And Dougherty agrees with
J.M. Balkin’s proposition that “we can [thus] compare certain
features of culture, and of the way that culture operates, to
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the software that is installed on a computer and that allows a
computer to process information” (90). Further, this cultural
software enjoys “scientific credibility” (90) because culture
allows certain beliefs to perpetuate and it disallows others
their voice. And Dougherty offered that Balkin’s cultural
software “answers the question of how traditions, beliefs,
desires, practices, and basic cultural ‘know-how’ spread through
society. For culture, think software installed on a computer;
for the human bearers of culture, think the computer hardware
that processes the software data” (qtd. in Dougherty: 90).
Through this technological screen, those of us who live in
western culture can more fully comprehend the importance and
significance of studying the brain, mind, and body through the
mind-body as software-hardware analogy. Likewise, Hayles (2002),
in an elaboration of her mind-body theory, similarly stated that
“the human who inhabits the information-rich environments of
contemporary technological societies knows that the dynamic and
fluctuating boundaries of her embodied cognitions develop in
relation to other cognizing agents embedded throughout the
environment, among which the most powerful are intelligent
machines” (303). And Haraway (1991) also offered ideas about the
influence of technologies on the way knowledge about the world
is constructed when she stated that there is “room for surprises
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and ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not
in charge of the world. We just live here and try to strike up
non-innocent conversations by means of our prosthetic devices,
including our visualization technologies” (199).
Through the series of conjunctures I have described above,
I developed my theory of the TPEC, the post-postmodern human
cultural machine that is able to stratify itself among the
formerly restrictive boundaries of cognitive science,
psychology, sociology, feminism, and technology to help western
culture move in new directions that acknowledge situatedness,
particularity, and more inclusive ranges of culturally accepted
values and ways of acquiring knowledge and knowing the world,
and participating in it. The idea of the politically embodied
cyborg is not the stuff of science fiction and fantasy, but it
is indeed the emerging reality of people (at least people in
U.S. culture). I maintain that this is especially true for women
in the western culture.
In this analysis by Hayles (2002), she draws on Roland
Barthes’ meditation on Albert Einstein and states, “Barthes
related the duality of physical brain and prodigious mind to a
split between Einstein the researcher and Einstein the knower of
the world’s innermost secrets. Rooted in the physical brain,
Einstein’s mind nevertheless seemed to have nearly occult powers
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of insight, at least in the popular imagination. This
oscillation between ordinary physical reality and occult power
translates . . . into a desire to use advanced technology to
reveal the constructedness of our everyday world” (310). Hayles
(2002) illustrates in a very powerful way that the embodied mind
approach to studying the brain, ways of knowing, and the
perpetuation of cultural values and norms can yield
extraordinary new insights into the ways humans shape and are
shaped by their internal, external, and digital worlds. And for
me, when the embodied mindset combines with feminism, texts and
technology, and thereby, politics, the opportunities for women’s
participation, empowerment, and respect, as well as more
inclusive worldviews expand exponentially. It is this
technological politically embodied cyborg, or TPEC, who writes
this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF THE TPEC
A book is not made of sentences
laid end to end,
but of sentences built . . .
into arcades and domes
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (2005)

Conclusions

The four major screens through which Virginia Woolf
examined her life and the lives of women, sex, sexuality, and
gender; aesthetics; misogyny and the economics of enough; and
epistemology are the filters through which she critiqued her
culture and the status of women within it during the time that
she lived (1882-1941). I think that it is evident from the
textual technological examples that I have provided that the
screens Woolf employed are still relevant today, especially for
women, and they are useful tools for exploring women’s creative
work in digital environments.
In the 21st Century U.S., women are engaged in every aspect
of society, including those areas that maintain labels such as
non-traditional, progressive, and feminist, as well as the more
traditional, home-based roles (“housewives” being one, whose
cultural meaning is currently in a state of rapid change because
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of a variety of cultural influences, not the least of which is
the “Housewives Of” series on the Bravo cable TV channel). In
the decades since Woolf’s time, women have emerged through the
aftermath of several wars, sexual revolutions, the “me” decade
of the 80s, the return to “balance” in the 90’s, and the current
new millennial era, which is unfolding as I write, as TPECs who
are still struggling for equality but also are well-equipped to
fully participate in the shaping of the digital future. These
Woolfian screens resonate with current cultural topics that can
be used in technological environments such as Web sites like
Jezebel.com, Grupo Factor X, and Current.com, Facebook accounts
such as Minal Hajratwala and Feminism is Important to the 21st
Century, and blogs such as Mom-101, all of which garner
attention from the media, academicians, and the general public,
have something to say about how women live, work, play, and
struggle in the world, and assist TPECs in recognizing each
other and supporting like-minded contributions.
When examining contemporary culture by screening through
the ways that men and women perceive their sexuality and gender
roles, certain trends quickly surface that continue to resonate
in the digital culture of the U.S. today. The fluid identities
that our culture includes, such as gender-bending avatars in
online gaming, gender-neutral screen names in interest groups
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and chat rooms, and even anonymous cyber-sexual experiences
resonate with Woolf’s fascination with “alternative membership”
(Lee 638). These concerns appear at the forefront of Woolf’s A
Room of One’s Own (2005), and they bear the weight of careful
examination of progressive theories of epistemology and
scientific study. In fact, Lee (1998) describes the powerful A
Room of One’s Own (2005) as “bids for freedom” (520). She also
states that A Room of One’s Own (2005) has a “utopian ending”
and sets women “free from histories of repressions and
limitations” (520). I have shown how 21st Century TPECs are
proving Woolf right through their progressive work in digital
environments.
Had she lived in the 21st Century, Woolf might have found
another outlet for her own progressive thoughts, words, and
actions in some of the digital venues that are available today.
In doing so, she too might have felt freed “through the idea of
a woman’s writing, from the pressures of the family, the doom of
fate, the prison of madness” (Lee 521). For example, Lee (1998)
states in her biography of Woolf that,
In her twenties Virginia Stephen was sexually confused and
uncertain . . . there was no acceptable outlet for her
erotic feelings about women—as there were accredited ways
of behaving for the Apostolic Cambridge homosexuals, or for
randy bohemian artists . . . with their wives and
mistresses. Except as a joke, she did not define herself as
a lesbian (or, as she would say, as a ‘Sapphist’): it was
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not a concept for her, or a group for her to join, or a
political identity. Instead, she was poised between
incompatible identities and roles (241).
Further, through her writing, especially through A Room of One’s
Own (2005), Woolf found ways to express her ideas about and
struggles with identity. Lee (1998) wrote that Woolf had “her
own great variety of selves” (522), and additionally, “She knew
that she had different ways of presenting her own identity”
(522).
It is clear that Woolf embodied the TPEC’s fluid identity.
Unfortunately for Woolf, there were few if any outlets in which
she could express her multiple selves, and this void, in part,
might have contributed to her well-known lack of self-worth,
depression, and anxiety. Had Woolf access to communities of
like-minded individuals that included women, stabilizing
psychotropic medications (a complicated suggestion which, with
regard to women’s use of them in current times, could fill many
another entire dissertation and then some), some progress
towards equality for women, and other advancements, she might
have found a validity in her ideas and ideals that may have
helped her through some of her mental crises.
It is no secret that Virginia Woolf committed suicide, and
I don’t want to finish this dissertation, which contains so much
analysis of the positive attributes of her mind and her work
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without in some way confronting this difficult subject. Though I
am not a psychologist, I can’t help but wonder whether her bouts
with self-loathing may have been soothed in some way by
connecting with like-minded individuals who may have “liked” her
Facebook update or provided an affirming comment on her blog
post? Could her emerging feminist identity have been validated
by understanding that many people grapple with similar
psychological issues and that in some ways these can be mediated
by participation in textual technologies? How would currentlyavailable psychotropic medications for bipolar disorder have
affected Woolf’s writing, convictions, and persistence of
thought? These questions really can’t be answered, but I
understand that they exist and add a troubling dimension to the
arguments that I make. But Woolf was not unaware of her mental
condition. In fact, she was keenly aware of her idiosyncracies,
mental frailties, and inconsistent health. In reading Lee’s
biography, it became clear to me that Woolf’s health problems
actually made her convictions stronger, intensified her desire
for expression, and increased her ability to take risks.
Woolf also struggled with some of the issues that concern
cultural critics, theorists, and commentators today about the
Internet, especially the notion that anyone can be anything in
cyberspace. In the virtual world, “lying” is the norm. Woolf
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commented on the unease caused by the shifting, in some ways
fabricated, identities that she recognized in herself when she
stated that “Lying had always seemed to her a dull form of
conversation; but after all, lie one must” (qtd. in Lee: 517).
In other words, in order for women to make progress, they
sometimes have to devise ways of working within their
patriarchal culture to subvert it. The notion of working from
within patriarchal culture to subvert its oppression of women is
the basis of many feminist arguments and theories. That
cyberspace becomes a field of exploration for this conversation
is not surprising because in many ways, the online world is a
frontier that has yet to be settled. Opportunities for women
abound, and perhaps the TPEC will enable such a fluid perception
of truth that “lying,” under its current derogatory definition,
will no longer exist.
Woolf often wrote about the therapeutic value of reading
and writing, but those pursuits also troubled her because she
found the content of almost all literature, histories, political
documents, and biographies lacking of input by women and respect
for women. And although she struggled with the meaning of the
term feminism, I believe she would have agreed that feminism is
central to women’s progress in writing, to their ability to use
words to improve the culture in which they live, and to
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perpetuating a TPEC future that values women’s contributions,
ideas, and intelligence.
Woolf clearly envisioned a TPEC future for politically
engaged feminist textual technological activist women writers
when she wrote, “these are difficult questions which lie in the
twilight of the future” (76). The TPEC in the 21st Century
combines Woolf’s politically embodied writer with Haraway’s
cyborg and the capabilities of women who use Internet
technologies. The TPEC honors Woolf’s (2005) assertion that “a
book is not made of sentences laid end to end, but of sentences
built, if an image helps, into arcades and domes” (76), and I
show how her work may have influenced the creative
postmodernized writing of the women who run Web sites, update
Facebook accounts, and blog.
I have researched and analyzed the variety of technologyenhanced methods TPECs use to engender writing, assert their
identities, bring their thoughts to light, and make their
positions known. In the end, TPEC writing is “adapted to the
body”(Woolf 2005 77), tampers “with the expected sequence”
(Woolf 2005 80), and “catch[es] those unrecorded gestures, those
unsaid or half-said words, moths on the ceiling, when women are
alone, unlit by the capricious and coloured light of the other
sex” (Woolf 2005 83). The TPEC understands “the effects of
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oppression on the body—giving it its form, its gestures, its
movement, its motricity, and even its muscles” (Wittig 1992).
The TPEC writes “unconsciously, merely giving things their
natural order, as a woman would, if she wrote like a woman . . .
who has forgotten that she is a woman, so that her pages [are]
full of that curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is
unconscious of itself” (Woolf 2005 90-91). And finally, The TPEC
writes “what [it wishes] to write, that is all that matters; and
whether it matters for ages or only for hours, nobody can say”
(Woolf 2005 105). Would that we as scholars and/or our students
manifest any of these qualities in our writing, universities and
U.S. culture in general would become richer, more diverse, and
thoroughly dynamic environments in which to live.
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